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Restatement of Place* 
Mae Kuykendall† 
INTRODUCTION 
This article will explore the possible fit for a 
Restatement project of a large domain of human perception 
that pervades legal reasoning as an unstated background 
assumption. The domain is that of place, a term that deserves 
clarification for this article by comparison with related terms, 
such as territory and space. Place as a legal subject brings forth 
thoughts of the nation-state, jurisdiction, sovereignty, and the 
norms in international law affecting the reach of a sovereign into 
the territory of another sovereign. Those concerns are necessarily 
touched upon in this article, but the chief objectives are to (1) 
illustrate, through a survey of place’s effect in several very 
different legal contexts, how ideas about place have influenced 
legal reasoning, and (2) evaluate the possibility of making place a 
topic around which Restatement principles could be fashioned. 
Place, as a factor that is present in law but often not fully seen, 
has not been recognized for its theoretical importance as a 
viewpoint from which to understand the functioning and 
implications of many areas of the law. For example, place may be 
present in a legal regime for transactions that have escaped the 
hold of any physical place, while the regime is still rationalized 
 
 *  © 2014 Mae Kuykendall. All Rights Reserved. 
 † Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Director, 
Legal E-Marriage Project, http://www.law.msu.edu/marriage/index.html. I am indebted 
to the intellectual vitality brought to the topic of place within law by the Workshop: 
The Spatial Constitution (convened by David Delaney at the National Science 
Foundation, Arlington, Virginia, June 13–14, 2013), about which workshop participant 
Professor Marc Poirier has kept me informed. Professor Poirier has been a valuable 
source of information for me since early summer 2013 about these scholarly efforts. 
The workshop brought together a number of geographers and legal scholars in an 
attempt to spark awareness, communication, and potential collaboration among an 
emerging set of scholars and disparate disciplines concerned with the investigation of 
the influence of ideas and conceptions of place with legal doctrine at macro and micro 
levels. I wish to thank Ruth Mendel, who has been consistently a good source of insight 
and encouragement. I would also like to extend gratitude to Professor Anita Bernstein, 
Professor Brian Kalt, Professor Mark Totten, Mary Elizabeth Oshei, Yassaman 
Hajivalizadeh, the University of Michigan Law Library (special thanks to Seth 
Quidachay-Swan), Barbara Bean and other Michigan State law librarians. 
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by an imaginary framework of physical location. Conversely, as 
place fades from importance in a given domain of law, place-
based views of the subject of those domains can remain a 
source of moral framing or legal answers to ambiguous issues. 
The law of chattel slavery in the South exemplified the 
conceptual complications of place in a period of transition in 
cultural arrangements and modes of exchange of property. 
Slavery, in particular the American version, was first 
rationalized in a place-anchored world, in which masters acting 
out purportedly feudal ideals exercised dominion over inferior 
beings to whom they provided direct care and the moral 
guidance owed by a master to a servant.1 Writings in support of 
slavery imagined personal connections between master and slave, 
with duties of stewardship justified in moral understandings 
drawn from ancient practices and Biblical precepts.2 The legal 
treatment of slaves wavered, however, because the legally 
abstract right of property, in ordinary cases, was absolute, and 
there could thus be no duties between a master and a slave who 
lacked legal personhood.3 Thus, some states imposed duties and 
prohibitions on slave owners, while others did not. 
Simultaneously, however, the law of commercial transactions 
made of the slave’s body an un-situated commodity, implicitly 
priced in the Liverpool trading market that set a going price of 
 
 1 JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS 
xi-xii (1982) (explaining paternalism as a blend of strict stratification with a goal of 
organic unity in a social order). 
 2 GEORGE W. FREEMAN, THE RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF SLAVE-HOLDERS: TWO 
DISCOURSES DELIVERED ON NOVEMBER 27, 1836, IN CHRIST CHURCH, RALEIGH, NORTH 
CAROLINA 5-7 (Reprinted ed., 1837), available at http://archive.org/stream/
rightsdutiesofsl00free#page/n5/mode/2up (explaining that slavery is “one of the penal 
consequences of sin” in the requirement of labor and the necessity of apportioning 
supervision of labor to the father, as the head of families who would emulate his 
relationship with God in his mastery over his children and inferior beings made to 
labor). George M. Frederickson explains religion-derived rationalizations used by 
whites to overcome Christian universalism, with the related idea of “one blood,” and 
how these whites see themselves as “the natural masters of Africans.” GEORGE M. 
FREDERICKSON, RACISM: A SHORT HISTORY 46-7 (2002). 
 3 Many writers have described the evolution over time of the legal treatment 
of slaves, with Southern law wavering between a conception of slaves as nothing more 
than absolute property to whom no duty could be owed, and as human beings 
accountable for their own crimes and potentially protected from willful killing, except 
in defined circumstances. See generally THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND 
THE LAW: 1619–1860 (1996). For a meticulous account of the early recognition of slaves’ 
humanity and the gradual movement of the law toward denying all protections to 
slaves, see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH: STATE V. 
MANN IN HISTORY AND LITERATURE (2003) (analyzing the law’s struggle to explain the 
premises of slavery). 
2014] RESTATEMENT OF PLACE 759 
 
cotton and other slave-produced commodities and intensified the 
demand on the slave’s body for rapid production of commodities.4 
The struggle of the law to reconcile the claimed moral 
underpinnings of slavery with the concept of property, within a 
partly feudal society, existed alongside the full development of 
the laws underpinning these global commercial transactions. And 
the law of commerce ultimately rendered place, and the 
sentiments that can hold sway within conditions of proximity and 
community, a lost detail in a world of accelerated communication, 
market quotations, and the capacity to transmute a human life 
into a tradable commodity across distances. Thus, the logic and 
law of slavery was bifurcated within the South between the 
premises of a place-anchored order that drew upon fading 
paternalistic values and a fluid system of mobile capital that 
priced slaves as a mobile commodity, available for sale pursuant 
to impersonal market logic and with no humane regard for their 
embodiment in any place at all.5 The tension between human 
beings as property and as intrinsically human began to be 
unmanageable and irretrievably incoherent. The conceptual 
confusion could not be solved. 
Marriage procedure in the early twenty-first century 
exhibits a similar logical tension between the moral sway of 
physical proximity over a legal arrangement and the sweeping 
cultural transitions in marriage meaning and ceremonial 
practices that render the place-centered legal regime for marriage 
access flawed. As a presumed anchor for creating and regulating 
the marital status in law, geography has lost its grounding in the 
decisive effect on “community” of physical proximity and limited 
mobility. Yet marriage law continues to embrace a literalist 
 
 4 WALTER JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE 
COTTON KINGDOM 249 (2013). Indeed, as Johnson explains,  
By 1820, the daily practice of slave traders—gathering information about the 
economy by inquiring into the price of cotton in New Orleans, New York, and 
Liverpool and the price of slaves in the Upper and Lower South, comparing 
them, and making a bet about whether the “market” would rise or fall—was 
sufficiently developed to ensure that slave prices in Richmond, Charleston, 
and New Orleans would track both one another and the price of cotton (and 
to a lesser degree that of sugar) with a remarkable precision. The daily 
practice of the slave trade . . . knit a territory that stretched from Louisiana 
to Maryland into a single slave economy. 
Id. at 41-42; see also OAKES, supra note 1, at xiii (asserting “the profound impact of the 
market economy on the nature of slavery”). 
 5 OAKES, supra note 1; see also JOHNSON, supra note 4, at 11 (describing “the 
tension between ‘the South’ as a region of the global economy and ‘the South’ as a 
region of the United States of America—by the tension between the promiscuity of 
capital and the limits prescribed by the territorial sovereignty of the United States”). 
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approach to the claim of territorial jurisdiction over the 
solemnization of marriages. At the same time, the culture 
increasingly embraces marital connections arising from 
mobility, cross-cultural interactions, and marriage ceremonies 
severed from a local context. Despite the changing cultural 
context of marriage ceremonies, states fail to modify the tie of the 
marriage ceremony to physical presence by a couple. States fail to 
use their existing power to confer marital status remotely, which 
they possess to authorize marriages valid in their jurisdiction and 
in as many others as raise no policy objection to the marriage 
itself.6 Thus, any prudent procedure to grant marriage status 
remotely is as effective as the universal practice of allowing 
couples who make a brief visit to a state and who marry during 
that visit the benefit of that state’s marriage licensing law.7  
Yet the existing geography-based rule requires the use 
of a marriage license within the territorial limits of the issuing 
state. Exploring the nature of that literalism reveals other 
marriage literalisms, including the obsolete use of a creaky “state 
interest” in denying marriage comity. The Supreme Court’s recent 
rejection of a federal interest in denying recognition to same-sex 
marriages for federal law purposes8 reveals the thinness of any 
claimed interest by states in territorial control. The sense that 
requirements of physical presence in the state that issues a 
license somehow protect, for example, a local culture of marriage, 
or vulnerable individuals, ignores the widespread mobility 
associated with marriage ceremonies performed away from a 
home location of the couple. 
A geographic skepticism, and awareness, queries the 
fading logic of state marriage procedure, which dates from the 
early twentieth century. With a skeptical view of stale procedures 
that tie marriage formalization to temporary physical presence in 
a specified locale, states might experiment with a marriage 
regime that lets couples choose their preferred marriage law, 
much as corporations elect a governing law for internal affairs at 
the time of incorporation. Yet there is little reason for states to 
innovate, given the current legislative incentives. States compete 
for marriage tourism, and have little motivation or guidance to 
devise procedures for their marriage law to be consumed 
 
 6 Adam Candeub & Mae Kuykendall, Modernizing Marriage, 44 U. MICH. J. 
L. REFORM 735, 737 (2011). 
 7 Id. at 795-96. 
 8 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (holding that the 
federal law denying recognition for federal purposes to valid marriages served “no 
legitimate purpose”). 
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remotely. Lawyers do not have practices connected with entry 
into marriage by couples, so there is no natural lobby to seek 
law improvement and efficiency. Thus, the assumption that 
place and marriage are tightly intertwined continues to be a 
default intuition, despite fading logic. An undertaking for 
general law improvement through examination of the role of 
place in generating legal procedures that do not achieve useful 
purposes and impose needless cost provides a template for 
innovation to benefit couples who may need access to marriage 
law from a distance. An antiquated, unreflective assumption 
about place could be removed from the framework of law with 
careful attention to the actual benefit of place-anchored 
marriage licensing law. 
With these examples affecting slave law and marriage 
procedure, and as I develop in the body of this article, I 
maintain that much of law contains some element of place as 
either an overt topic (jurisdiction, justifiable use of deadly 
force, regulation of spontaneous roadside memorials), as an 
unnoticed intuition, or as a metaphor used without the rigor of 
close scrutiny for its capacity to bear analytic weight. First, 
however, a concession should be made for the hazards of 
attempting to organize and analyze for practical applications in 
law the domain claimed by “place” in the human imagination. I 
am also on warning of the risks of tautology.9 
Insofar as I claim a wide domain for place in law, I risk 
either triviality, by confirming something obvious, or analytic 
sprawl that defies organization or focus for failure to exclude any 
part of the universe. My effort might be thought the opposite of 
the originally announced ALI plan of restating the law as an 
attempt at simplification.10 But the material in which place is 
either an overt or unreflective topic in legal thought is broad, so 
the effort to recognize its reach into law, through a partial but 
broad set of examples, seems a reasonable effort at assessing its 
manageability as a feature of law that could be translated into 
a set of principles. 
In effect, the undertaking challenges the assumption that 
the common law is fundamentally sound as an empirical result of 
 
 9 I thank Prof. Bernstein for her stern but kind tutorial on the need for 
exclusion of some legal subjects from a vast universe of place-influenced topics and the 
need for practical utility of any potential restatement project. Telephone Interview 
with Anita Bernstein, Anita and Stuart Subotnick Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law 
School (July 13, 2013). 
 10 Charles E. Clark, The Restatement of the Law of Contracts, 42 YALE L.J. 643, 
644 (1933) (citing Radio Program of the American Bar Association announcing President 
Wickersham’s address on May 7, 1933, on Restating the Law; an Attempt at Simplification). 
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trial-and-error reasoning with cases, and that the restatement 
undertaking properly resists the creation of statutory free-hand 
abstractions or novel concepts which are necessarily subject to the 
cross currents of political contestation and untested by judicial 
application and refinement.11 Various topics that have not lent 
themselves to restatements and instead have fostered Principles 
or Model Codes exemplify the potential for producing principles of 
the law of place. Though often controversial,12 Principles projects 
create baselines for debate and norms for consideration as 
approved by ALI members after wide vetting. Saul Levmore has 
offered an excursion into the possibilities of new categorizations 
within common law by exploring whether “deception” might be 
distinguished as an area of the law, considering what utility 
there might be in developing a theory of deception, and 
discussing how “natural” categories of law could be identified.13 
 
 11 David A. Logan usefully compiles the rationales and summaries offered by 
leading figures in the intellectual provenance of the ALI Restatement project. David A. 
Logan, When the Restatement Is Not A Restatement: The Curious Case of the “Flagrant 
Trespasser”, 37 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1448, 1475-78 (2011) (capturing the sentiment 
for incrementalism, avoidance of restatement topics that do not arise from 
experimentation by judges, and willingness to tolerate an incomplete answer to a 
complex problem). Professor Marc Poirier suggests that in an instance of an unnoted 
category in law, a statement that adopts advocacy is a good approach. E-mail from 
Marc Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author (Aug. 
30, 2013, 7:11 EST) (on file with author). 
 12 Robert G. Bone, The Puzzling Idea of Adjudicative Representation: Lessons 
for Aggregate Litigation and Class Actions, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 577, 577-79 (2011) 
(praising the Principles of the Law of Aggregate Litigation as “a remarkable 
achievement,” but suggesting there is continuing conceptual confusion regarding issue 
preclusion); William J. Carney, The ALI’s Corporate Governance Project: The Death of 
Property Rights?, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 898, 898 (1993) (referring to the final approval 
of the ALI Principles of Corporate Governance: Analysis and Recommendations as “the 
most controversial event in the history of American corporate law”); Joel Seligman, A 
Sheep in Wolf ’ s Clothing: The American Law Institute Principles of Corporate 
Governance Project, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 325, 328 (1987). For a review of critiques of 
the ALI project, as well as specific controversies affecting the Restatement of the Law 
of Restitution, see Doug Rendleman, Restating Restitution: The Restatement Process 
and Its Critics, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 933, 933 (2008) (concluding that the ALI 
attains “consensus doctrine that is accurate and legitimate, yet not frozen in time”). 
 13 Levmore states: 
Deception is a regular feature of matters that give rise to legal conflict, and yet we 
do not think of cases with deception or fraud as a common element as doctrinally 
related. I will suggest here that they can, in fact, usefully be thought of as a 
group. From that observation there follows the more abstract question of why 
judges have not thought of these cases as related. The common denominator of 
“deception” has not often motivated them to decide cases in ways that take into 
account decisions rendered in other deception cases. My aim here is to explain 
this sort of narrow judicial focus, or brand of “minimalism” as I will sometimes 
call it, and to argue that the reason for this selective minimalism is an important 
and unrecognized part of the common [l]aw process. Deception is hardly the only 
window to this observation about the common law process, but it is one such 
opening and, in any event, the one inspected here. 
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So my task in this piece is to provide demonstrative 
examples of the presence of place in the construction of law; to 
suggest how a rigorous analysis of its presence across dimensions 
of law might proceed; and to suggest the manner in which 
principles might be shaped to guide law-making or the application 
of common law. To avoid the risks of rhetorical tautology, I will 
suggest an area of the law in which place is not a presence, and 
try to suggest the level of abstraction at which common principles 
might be articulated in certain domains of place to advance sound 
legal use of place logic. I will also propose a small number of 
articulations of principle in a concrete subject area to suggest 
how “place” principles might be given form. 
Section I of this article will discuss the meaning of “place,” 
by juxtaposing it with similar terminologies: territory and space. 
In order to begin identifying place as a key component of legal 
reasoning, Section II will give a brief overview of place within a 
legal context. Section III examines buried assumptions that 
emerge over time as an overt category for legal management and 
classification and reviews some of the emerging scholarly interest 
in place as a background cultural assumption in flux. Section IV 
considers metaphors of place that orient perception, and then 
does a limited first cut at cataloguing specific uses of place in 
law.14 The cataloguing undertaken in Section IV will use 
relatively broad characterizations of legal applications of place 
reasoning, with tentative labels: micro-identity-intensifying 
settings, place-modified citizenship rights,15 and so forth. The 
initial listing is meant to invite further theoretical work, devising 
the most usable levels of abstraction for organization of a treatise 
                                                                                                                                     
Saul Levmore, A Theory of Deception and Then of Common Law Categories, 85 TEX. L. 
REV. 1359, 1359 (2007). 
 14 Other cataloguing precedes my effort. For example, the chapters in LEGAL 
GEOGRAPHIES are an implicit catalogue, but they do not overtly claim a cataloguing 
mission. They are provided as a topical exploration of the unexamined category of 
space as an entry point into recognizing and “mapping” the deep but unacknowledged 
presence of assumptions about space that give law a sense of coherence and stability. 
THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE xix (Nicholas Blomley, 
David Delaney & Richard Ford eds., 2001). I intend to do a tentative and incomplete 
cataloguing as a means of tying this attempt to my own direct review of legal materials 
and cultural commentary, with a hope to enrich the available thinking on the 
ubiquitous presence of place as an element of law and to stimulate and provoke 
interest in further classification and analysis of place across dimensions of its use. 
 15 See infra note 155 and accompanying text; see also Barack Obama, 
President of the United States, Remarks at the National Defense University (May 23, 
2013), video and transcript available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/05/24/us/politics/
transcript-of-obamas-speech-on-drone-policy.html?_r=0 (explaining the rationale for 
lethal strikes on U.S. citizens abroad). Though President Obama argues in the speech 
that internal processes of legal review provided due process, one may surmise that no 
such claim would be made concerning a citizen present in the United States. 
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on place as a legal topic and for further work on the viability of 
place assumptions in a world of increasing “displacement,” 
through remote communication and digital creations of physical 
settings and characters, of literal place as a grounding feature 
of lives. Sections V and VI of the article present examples of 
particular areas of legal reasoning in which place has figured 
particularly prominently, and Section VII provides some 
suggestions for statements of principle affecting these place 
topics. 
I. PLACE: WHAT IS THE MEANING OF THE TERM AND WHAT 
IS IT LIKE AND UNLIKE? 
A. Distinguishing Place from Space from Territory 
This Part examines the related ideas of place, space, 
and territory, all of which overlap but have distinct connotations. 
In a primer on place, Tim Cresswell explains that place is 
seemingly such a familiar idea that little care is taken to define 
its meaning; “Place is a word that seems to speak for itself.”16 In 
comparison with space, place is material while space is not. 
“Spaces have areas and volumes. Places have space between 
them.”17 Even nonexistent place takes on an “imaginary 
materiality.”18 For some geographers and their allies however, 
space is treated as blank and unarticulated, while place is given a 
human quality by its function as a site for (re)producing culture. 
For others, by contrast, space might be seen as discursive, and 
place as physical, or they may be thought to overlap.19 There is 
some lack of consistency in the use of these terms. 
Territory, unlike either place or space, has some overt 
legal associations. Place and space, by comparison, frame much 
legal reasoning, but are not concepts that are themselves infused 
with a formal claim about legal authority. They play background 
 
 16 TIM CRESSWELL, PLACE: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 1 (2004). 
 17 CRESSWELL, supra note 16, at 8. 
 18 Id. at 7. 
 19 E-mail from Marc Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School 
of Law, to author (Aug. 30, 2013, 7:30 PM EST) (on file with author); see also Marc 
Poirier, Gender, Place, Discursive Space: Where Is Same-Sex Marriage?, 3 FIU L. REV. 
307, 313-14 (2008) [hereinafter Discursive Space] (citing Dale v. Boy Scouts of Am., 734 
A.2d 1196 (N.J. 1999), rev’d, 530 U.S. 640 (2000)) . The New Jersey Supreme Court 
rejected the argument that the Boy Scouts were not a “place” within the meaning of 
New Jersey public accommodations law, refusing “to construe ‘place’ so as to include 
only membership associations that are connected to a particular geographic location or 
facility.” Dale, 734 A.2d at 1208-10. As state law, the New Jersey holding is 
undisturbed by subsequent Supreme Court review. 
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roles, but territory generates the framework of law. David 
Delaney emphasizes the social production of territories and their 
contentious roots,20 citing work on the derivation of the word 
“territory” that connects its roots to terra, or earth, and terrere, 
or to frighten.21 He concludes with a definition meant to be 
stripped to descriptive essentials: “As a first approximation, a 
territory—regarded in isolation, as is often the case in 
definitions—is a bounded social space that inscribes a certain sort 
of meaning onto defined segments of the material world.” A 
simple territory marks a differentiation between an “inside” and 
an “outside.”22 
B. Place as “Situatedness” 
Place, or in its meaning as a material or imaginary factor 
of human awareness, “situatedness,” is basic to human cognition 
and self-definition. As with the human body, place seems a given: 
fixed, uncontrived, and objective. As a result, a general challenge 
to place as definitive for one’s legal person is not readily stated or 
understood. Place, as a measure of “situatedness,” always shapes 
the facts law mediates, and as such, place claims a central role as 
the background assumption of law. 
Reviewing some of the subtleties and ramifications of 
embedded suppositions about human situatedness may allow for 
recognition of illusions of order concealing complexity. Such 
complexity, if disaggregated and organized into defensible 
rationales, might yield its mysteries to some progress toward the 
goal for which a restatement strives—“comprehensive, rationalist, 
universal, and general compilation . . . .”23 Talking about a 
Restatement of place can refocus the ALI’s attention on how to 
bring coherence and rationality to an unstable underpinning of 
much legal doctrine. 
Place, for example, defines citizenship,24 and citizenship 
defines prospects. In tyrannical countries, place defines a 
 
 20 DAVID DELANEY, TERRITORY: A SHORT INTRODUCTION 94 (2005). While 
conceding that territories provide security to those on the “inside” from those on the 
“outside,” Delaney also notes that ideas of territory have led to hundreds of thousands 
of deaths in recent years. Id. at 3. 
 21 Id. at 14. 
 22 Id. at 14 (elaborating further on the defining powers of a territorial line).  
 23 Anita Bernstein, Restatement (Third) of Torts: General Principles and the 
Prescription of Masculine Order, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1367, 1370 (2001). 
 24 Complications disrupt the simple association of place with citizenship. 
Citizenship can be inherited. For a discussion of the means of gaining citizenship, and a 
conception of citizenship as property, see Ayelet Shachar & Ran Hirschl, Citizenship as 
Inherited Property, 35 POL. THEORY 253, 253 (2007) (calling for increased critical scrutiny 
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boundary between human rights and danger. Arbitrary, life-
ending power, imposed without recourse for its targets, arises 
from the vagaries of one’s place in a moment of time, and from 
constellations of power controlling a place and blocking exit or 
safe resettlement. Tyranny, war, and famine are features of the 
brute power of man or nature to end lives within the confines of 
a place, while the outside world, transcending place, views the 
endings with concern.25 
The stakes place imposes in a federalist nation—such as 
the United States today—are less dramatic than the risks and 
rewards of one’s assigned place on the global map. They come in 
milder forms. Place in the United States means variations in legal 
cultures and legal regimes moderated by national commitments 
to individual rights.26 The variation in legal rights can be 
substantial, as with water and property law across the United 
States. By contrast, the domain of contracts is substantially 
consolidated as a result of the Uniform Commercial Code. And 
procedure varies considerably, as any student studying for a bar 
exam is aware. 
In addition, some rights do not follow the person in a 
federalist system, as has been the case with marriages that are 
not portable from one state to another because of a state’s claim to 
                                                                                                                                     
of jus soli (territoriality) and jus sanguinis (parentage) as a basis for allocating 
citizenship, and noting that citizenship is a critical factor in life chances). Further 
complications arise where a culture defines citizenship tribally rather than by place; see 
DELANEY, supra note 20, at 44-45, or where a group is stateless and homeless, as are 
those called colloquially Gypsies, or, more correctly, Roma. For advocacy relating to their 
precarious status, see RESTLESS BEINGS, http://www.restlessbeings.org/projects/roma-
gypsies (last visited Nov. 19, 2013). I thank Marc Poirier for pointing to the need to 
account for variant means of gaining citizenship. 
 25 Judith Butler, Neale Wheeler Watson Lecture: Precarious Life and the 
Obligations of Cohabitation (May 2011) [hereinafter Butler Speech]. For further 
mediations on the political and ethical implications of human vulnerability, see JUDITH 
BUTLER, PRECARIOUS LIFE: THE POWERS OF MOURNING AND VIOLENCE (2004). 
 26 The just-decided case of U.S. v. Windsor provides the germ of an idea about 
the limitations of place in marriage: though the federal government through Congress 
“can make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges,” United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2690 (2013), territorial sovereignty does not allow it to do so in 
a way that targets a class of people to diminish their rights. Id. at 1292. States may 
directly control the definition of marriage within their boundaries, but, like the federal 
government, states are restrained in their territory-based claims of control by the 
requirement to “respect the constitutional rights of persons.” Id. at 2691. Somehow state 
territory rules marriage as part of a presumed natural order in which the Constitution 
allocates control of marriage to states in accordance with a map and in which the federal 
government may play a supplementary role. But within the entire territory of the United 
States ideas about individual rights supersede claims based on assertions of any scale of 
territorial “final say.” The level of U.S. protection for rights of persons gradually places 
marriage outside of the logic of place as the author of personal fate. 
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a policy interest in negating the marriage.27 With the recent 
announcement by the Obama administration that federal 
recognition of marriage will be based on a couple’s choice of a 
place of celebration, without regard to non-recognition treatment 
in their state of residence, the iron control of place over marriage 
status is waning, with relatively little recognition of the extent 
of the sea change in the local, place-based hold over the 
incidents of marital status.28 
At various times, place in the United States meant a lack 
of basic rights for African-Americans—to move to a state as a free 
black citizen, to vote, to own property protected by law, to call 
upon law enforcement for protection, or, when slavery existed, to 
have a fair chance at forming an autonomous life with family and 
friends. In many Southern states, place meant the power to 
banish freed slaves;29 place, as comprehended as territory, and 
control of territory as control of culture, was incompatible with 
their presence.30 Today, place can mean subjection to harsh laws, 
harshly enforced. Or it may mean subjection to violence 
unchecked by police intervention or unpunished by retrospective 
accountings.31 Place in the United States can still be dangerous 
to the flourishing of life. 
 
 27 Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377 (2012). 
 28 For a piece pointing to a future for forms of marriage portability that overcome 
place in our federalist system, see Mae Kuykendall, The Converging Logic of Federalism 
and Equality Logic in Same-Sex Marriage Recognition, AM. CONSTITUTION SOC’Y (Sept. 
2012), http://www.acslaw.org/publications/issue-briefs/the-converging-logic-of-federalism-
and-equality-in-same-sex-marriage-recog. For a distinctive examination of the theme of 
localism in United States v.Windsor, see generally Marc Poirier, “Whiffs of Federalism” in 
United States v. Windsor: Power, Localism, and Kulturkampf, 85 U. COLO. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014). 
 29 KENNETH M. STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERY IN THE 
ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 94 (1989) (describing a master’s offer to free his slaves contingent 
on their leaving both the state and the United States), 232-33 (enumerating state 
provisions restricting manumission and requiring freed slaves to leave the state within 
a specified period and, in some instances, the United States). 
 30 A transition in sovereignty can result in the elimination of property rights 
and the right to dwell, often worked out against subject populations along lines of race 
and ethnicity. See, e.g., MARÍA E. MONTOYA, TRANSLATING PROPERTY: THE MAXWELL 
LAND GRANT AND THE CONFLICT OVER LAND IN THE AMERICAN WEST, 1840–1900 107, 
113, 128 (2002) (explaining ejection suits). 
 31 Frank Perez, After UpStairs Lounge Fire, Gay and Straight New Orleans 
Changed, TIMES-PICAYUNE (June 22, 2013 8:55 AM), http://www.nola.com/opinions/
index.ssf/2013/06/after_upstairs_lounge_fire_gay.html (describing the “cruel” media 
coverage and the “dismissive police response” to an arson of a gay New Orleans club 
that caused 32 deaths, mainly of gay men). 
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II. THE LEGAL LOGIC OF PLACE: PLACE AS A FUNCTION OF 
LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF ORDER, SEPARATENESS, AND 
CONTROL  
A broad conception of the Restatement undertaking 
would be engaged by examining place as a topic for legal 
classification. Place does not present itself as a legal domain in 
the manner of the overtly legal doctrine with which the 
Restatement project bears an association.32 An attempt to 
catalogue, and then restate, the uses of place as a basis to define 
legal rights and obligations challenges the boundaries of the 
Restatement world of contained abstraction about pre-labeled 
bodies of legal concern33 brought together by a simple conceptual 
grouping: injury, promises, ownership, family forms—that is, areas 
of common law. Restatements, nevertheless, confront what 
Professor Anita Bernstein has called “a wilderness of Nature,” a 
mass of material that lacks the manifest rationalizing force of 
“comprehensive, rationalist, universal, and general compilation.”34 
Place is the wilderness of human cognition left at a loss for guiding 
principles that assign a moral weight to considerations of distance, 
exclusion, and proximity across virtually all dimensions of law. 
Legal scholarship on place has sought to identify the role 
of the nation-state as a critical influence on legal conceptions of 
place, in which a nation-state asserts a power coextensive with 
territory yet operates in a complex conceptual framework that 
allows for competing narratives for addressing specific legal 
problems.35 Law and geography scholarship has focused on the 
authority of the nation-state and on the capacity of territorial 
logic to properly “scale” problems of justice. “Scaling” proposals 
seek to draw legal boundaries relationally, and deny that territory 
is only spatial. Rather, “relationship” is posed as “the conceptual 
core” of territory.36 The normative goal is to achieve just 
resolutions for those not neatly located in a legal space defined by 
territory as a controlled space, with a concern for social justice for 
 
 32 Bernstein, supra note 23, at 1369-70 (suggesting, in connection with the 
Tort General Principles draft, that “the premise is that once accurately perceived, an 
object of gaze—for the ALI mainly decisional law, with statutes and scholarship 
occasionally included—will reveal its inner logic and coherence” (footnote omitted)). 
 33 Id. at 1389-90 (noting the tradition of drawing restatements from a narrow 
band of decisional law in an area of law, as well as a trend toward a diversity of sources 
for Restatements, or “[p]luralistic materials”). 
 34 Id. at 1370. 
 35 Hari M. Osofsky, The Geography of Justice Wormholes: Dilemmas from 
Property and Criminal Law, 13 VILL. L. REV. 117, 120-21 (2008). 
 36 Andrea Berghenti, On Territory as Relationship and Law as Territory, 21 
CANADIAN J. L. & SOC’Y 65, 67 (2006). 
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those classified as “other.”37 At the same time, broader efforts at 
classification have emerged.38 
The simplest conception of place as an element of lawful 
force and control—a dominant sense of reality—is of an inert, 
bounded physical territory subjected to a state’s assertion of 
control over its governance.39 As recently renewed and re-
emphasized by the Supreme Court, the sovereign claim over a 
territory is heavily presumed to be incompatible with the exercise 
of jurisdiction by another sovereign to enforce a norm of 
international law that occurred in the other sovereign’s 
territory.40 Intrusions into the territory are subject to the 
sovereign’s control and limited international norms, such as safe 
passage and security for diplomats.41 That simple conception has 
become a strong understanding in the law of nations, despite a 
complicated historical evolution in claims of authority over large 
expanses.42 Challenges to the naturalness of territorial 
conventions affecting sovereignty have become commonplace in 
scholarship, but remain relatively marginal in law. A powerful 
example is contained in the writings of David Delaney, one of a 
group of imaginative scholars who examine anomalies of 
geography, identity, and law: 
Greater attention to discourse and discursive practices . . . would 
complicate the (more or less) transparent model of communication that 
informs [Robert Sack’s classic 1986] Human Territoriality. It complicates 
our understanding of how territorializations give expression to the 
relationships between power, meaning, and experience. Attending to 
 
 37 Osofsky, supra note 35, at 118-19. 
 38 See THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, POWER AND SPACE , supra 
note 14, at xiii (referring in the preface, Where is Law?, to “how far removed we are 
from the spatio-legalities of the century before last”). 
 39 LAUREN BENTON, A SEARCH FOR SOVEREIGNTY: LAW AND GEOGRAPHY IN 
EUROPEAN EMPIRES 1400–1900 1-39 (2010) (bringing a new perspective to the understanding 
of mapping and law). As is suggested throughout this article, that dominant influence of place, 
meaning location, as an element of law loses much of its intuitive force with 
telecommunications. Many puzzles arise in the absence of clear grounding on the physical 
earth. Where did an act of fraud occur? Where did defamation occur? What community should 
be understood to apply community standards? Specific answers can be devised for selected 
questions, as a sort of ipse dixit of the controlling law-giver/applier, but a general logic of 
community would provide a hope for coherence in legal control over accountability. 
 40 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 1664-67 (2013) 
(emphasizing the presumption against extraterritorial application of a U.S. law or 
international law by a U.S. court in the absence of clear indication in the statute of 
intended extraterritorial reach and citing Blackstone on the limited offenses that 
existed against international law at the time the Alien Tort Act was passed). See 
CEDRIC RYNGAERT, JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 53 (2008) (referring to an 
aspiration for justice without the constraints imposed by territorial borders). 
 41 Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 
723 (2004)). 
 42 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 1-39. 
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discourse in this sense allows us to regard territorial complexes—such as 
those through which race and gender are expressed—more in terms of 
their cultural and historical particularities, and to situate specific 
practices, such as segregation, deportation, eviction, or confinement, less 
in terms of intentional strategies of rational actors and more in terms of 
cultural performances.43 
In this vision, the formal, logical reasoning that 
apportions sovereignty between territorial domains, creating 
presumptions between sovereigns whose will is understood as 
derived from something more grounded and core to legal 
authority than “cultural performances,” becomes peripheral to the 
human stakes in a world of “precarity” of the human condition.44 
In a world organized by territorially inscribed “cultural 
performances,” rules created by the identification of territoriality 
with sovereign legal dignity45 ignore human stakes of the sort that 
newer scholarship and political forces attempt to advance and 
protect.46 Casting his vote with the human beings put at risk by 
 
 43 DELANEY, supra note 20, at 94. 
 44 Butler Speech, supra note 25 (referring to “every political effort to manage 
populations [as involving] a tactical distribution of precarity”). 
 45 The idea of the “dignity” of a sovereign has made an appearance in 
American federalism as explicated by the Supreme Court. Justice John Roberts has 
introduced into the vocabulary of federalism the term “equal dignity” of the 50 states, 
awarded to them on the basis of sovereign status. Indeed, there is a brewing clash 
within the Supreme Court. Even as Justice Roberts develops a concept of the “dignity” 
of state sovereigns, see Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2623 (2013) 
(emphasizing the constitutional right of states to equal dignity), Justice Kennedy is 
working to develop a core notion of personal dignity that might overcome the claims of 
states to control the definition of marriage and thus to exclude same-sex couples in the 
name of the dignity of the state. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689, 
2692-94 (2013). The sense that Justice Kennedy is more poetic than legal in fashioning 
a doctrine of personal dignity gains its strength from the intuition that preservation of 
the sovereign dignity of law-giving states is superior to, and more grounded in 
something with solidity, than a theory of the personal dignity of persons under the 
United States Constitution. I am grateful to Marc Poirier for prompting this 
comparison. For a discussion of the novelty of the comparative dignity rubric for states, 
see generally Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 123 YALE J. ONLINE 175 (2013). 
 46 A good example of such a critique, in a recent specific context, concerns the 
use of the logic in Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), regarding extra-territoriality and 
sovereign dignity: 
Rather than obsessing about the bounded nature of state sovereignty and hiding 
behind self-interested concerns to avoid interference in the internal affairs of 
sovereign competitors, local communities who suffer from transnational 
environmental harms understand the reality of global interconnectedness, both 
ecological and economic. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources, 
sustainable development and the “e-word” [meaning extra-territoriality] are 
concepts invoked to solidify the ability of host states in both north and south to 
exploit resources ostensibly for the good of their peoples. Yet, if we are truly 
concerned with sovereignty of the people, we must as a global community 
encourage if not require our courts to provide a space for local communities who 
wish to both prevent and remedy intra-territorial environmental harm with a 
chance to voice their concerns. This is something that the ATS was clearly not 
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territorial-based sovereignty, Delaney dedicates his book: “For 
those who are unjustly excluded, expelled, confined, or 
invaded.”47 
Today place is increasingly understood as having multiple 
meanings, and proximity as posing as many puzzles as paths to 
insight. Both contemporary scholarship about the evolution of 
sovereignty48 and the manipulability of place perception by 
technology pose questions about the organic connection of law’s 
domain to the physical earth. 
Place as an implicit presence in much of law attracts 
ethical concerns by critics of the nation-state. In their view, states 
claim a territorial imperative that facilitates and may even 
promote population displacement and occupation, resulting in 
recurring crises that allocate the “precarity” of the human 
condition to some groups while insulating others.49 At a micro 
level, place situates embodied expectations and group behavior, 
some of which are enforced by legal rules.50 The privilege in some 
states of “standing one’s ground” with lethal effect allocates rights 
and inflicts loss, defining the micro-parameters of control over 
place in public. Hence, place constantly allows for settlements of 
ambiguities and anomalies that might foster legal loss of nerve if 
                                                                                                                                     
designed to do. Kiobel, due to its problematic invocation of the “e-word”, 
encourages us to pretend we live in a world built around impermeable sovereign 
borders, thus inhibiting our ability to take responsibly [sic] across borders as 
members of a global community sharing one earth. 
Sara Seck, Kiobel and the E-word: Reflections on Transnational Environmental 
Responsibility in an Interconnected World, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (July 5, 2013, 11:25 
AM), http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/07/sara-seck-on-kiobel-and-e-word.html. 
 47 See DELANEY, supra note 20, at dedication page. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Butler Speech, supra note 25. The extent of insulation can vary by place. In 
her book meditating on geography and identity, novelist Mary Gordon, in considering 
her security in a life, and a place, given to her by a university by admitting her and 
then fostering her career, describes the withdrawal that place can provide from the 
hazards faced by the less fortunate, and the smugness that may go with insulation 
from “precarity”:  
How do I speak of all of this? How, without incurring the suspicion that, 
accompanying the joyous click of the tongue in the lock’s groove of a beloved 
New York apartment, is an automatic sense of triumphalism? A smug “I’m 
here, therefore you’re not.” A satisfaction, like the ripple of an ocean breeze, 
of possession and exclusion. 
MARY GORDON, SEEING THROUGH PLACES: REFLECTIONS ON GEOGRAPHY AND IDENTITY 
254 (2000). 
 50 See generally ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF 
THE PUBLIC ORDER (1971). 
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place did not appear natural and inevitable as a driving 
rationale for much of law.51 
Conceptually, place is of increasing interest to a variety 
of scholars.52 Historians have long studied the connection 
between perceptions and mapping of territory and the 
establishment of empire and the development of law.53 In the last 
30 years, place as an anchoring feature of identity, cognition, and 
grounding in the world has been in flux. Puzzles about place in a 
world of wide mobility and disembodied life on the internet 
attract attention from a wide variety of disciplines. For example, 
architects and artists have noted the malleability of space and, in 
art, the “waning” of the human body from representation. One 
scholar has led tours through museums to demonstrate the 
“absence” of the body in one outlet for the human impulse to 
portray the critical visual components of the world as perceived.54 
Architects examine the increasing manipulation of design to 
channel behavior by shaping environments to conceal the forms of 
control being exercised.55 Psychologists investigate the 
commonality between the patterns of stalking in the physical 
world compared with cyberstalking.56 Ethicists and 
“transhumanist thinkers” address the implications of re-
configuring the human body with machine parts, thus moving 
toward a “posthuman” future.57 
That flux’s form and effects on human culture are difficult 
to capture and evaluate. In many venues, the “displacement of 
place” is portrayed as a positive, transformative linking of 
 
 51 For a provocative argument that the “expressive topography” in American 
life, meaning physical areas widely open to expressive liberty, is shrinking under the 
force of sovereign control of the spatiality of expression, see TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT 
OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN PUBLIC PLACES 2-3 (2008). 
 52 An indication of growing interest in the legal academy can be detected in 
the forthcoming program of the American Association of Law Schools (AALS). The 
Conflicts Section of AALS will present a program on “The New Territorialism and the 
Supreme Court.” The program will include talks “across a range of substantive and 
methodological fields,” including extraterritorial financial regulation, territorialism’s 
history, status and place in transnational tort, and governance in cyberspace. General 
e-mail from Louise Weinberg, William B. Bates Chair for the Administration of Justice, 
University of Texas School of Law, to Federal Courts listserve (Dec. 13, 2013 10:58 AM 
EST) (on file with author). 
 53 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 1-6. 
 54 Taylor Marsh, Figuring Absence: The Waning of the Body in Contemporary Art 
(Dec. 15, 2012) (Gallery Talk at the Arthur M. Sackler Museum, Cambridge, Mass.).  
 55 Lee Tien, Architectural Regulation and the Evolution of Social Norms, 7 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 1, 5-7 (2005) 
 56 L. P. Sheridan & T. Grant, Is Cyberstalking Different?, 13 PSYCHOL. CRIME 
& L. 627-40 (Dec. 2007). 
 57 Editorial, Ethics: The Questions Posed by Our Bionic Bodies, OBSERVER (June 
15, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/16/observer-editorial-
biotechnology-ethics (suggesting science is pushing us to a “posthuman future”). 
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humanity and empowerment of individuals. In other views, the 
loss of place and the technological transcendence to a boundary-
less space is criticized as a new source of danger: loss of grounding 
in a human context, anonymity as a means of harassment and 
targeting minorities, and potential for increased authoritarian 
control over the entire population of the globe.58 Additionally, 
there is intuitive concern that core celebratory moments lose 
constitutive and spiritual force if they are not embodied in 
moments of shared physical presence.59 If law is for the purpose 
of lending order and fairness to human activity, legal principles 
would benefit from a basic re-examination of place as a driver 
of law reasoning and law-backed power. The law surely has a 
role to play in sorting the legitimate role of place in protecting 
human welfare and the oppressive role of mere proximity over 
vulnerable humanity. 
III. THE EVOLUTION OF UNNOTICED ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT 
PLACE IN LEGAL REASONING: FROM INVISIBILITY TO 
CONTESTATION AND CLASSIFICATION 
Putting aside contested visions of a less “rooted” world, 
place simply recommends itself as a study of legal anomalies 
and unexamined organizing precepts that enable law to appear 
plausible without the need of deep ongoing inquiry into the 
metaphysics or phenomenology of legal rules.60 Place is the 
 
 58 The recent book by Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, THE NEW DIGITAL AGE: 
RESHAPING THE FUTURE OF PEOPLE, NATIONS AND BUSINESS 3-4 (2013), typifies the 
visionary, optimistic view that the partial “displacement of place” is empowering and 
transformative. The response by Julian Assange to the book, The Banality of ‘Don’t Be 
Evil’, N.Y. TIMES, June 1, 2013, at SR4, captures the sense that control of the internet 
is control of human liberty. 
 59 In fact, one scholar posed queries about the importance of “rootedness to place”: 
One way to approach this is to think about the parameters of place—in what 
situation is place imperative? I cannot envision a funeral without place—a 
service by satellite alone. Could a jury preside without a jury box? Could you 
empanel a jury who served in front of their individual computers, watching 
the proceedings and deliberating by video conference? It seems wrong. Does 
the right to confrontation mean the right to confront . . . on a video screen? If 
we balk at the concept of any of these proceedings without “place,” then the 
question is where the boundary is? How far can we move beyond the 
rootedness to place and still survive intact, being torn asunder?  
E-mail from Ruth Mendel, Independent Scholar, to author (June 1, 2013, 11:03 PM) (on 
file with author) (paragraphing omitted). 
 60 The “Who Am I” or the “What Are We” or “What Is Reality” questions of 
literature and philosophy are beyond the capacity of law to divine or incorporate, yet 
they lurk in the imposition by law of a core yet unreflective understanding of the world, 
with unstated reference to place as the key element in pragmatic deployment of 
comprehensibility and justification in law. See THE LEGAL GEOGRAPHIES READER: LAW, 
 
774 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 79:2 
strongest example of a deep orienting assumption that lacks a 
cohesive rationale other than metaphors embedded in basic, 
relatively unreflective thought. Its claim over the apportionment 
of legal authority, or jurisdiction, even where extraterritorial 
governmental action affecting rights protected by domestic law is 
involved, is “tenacious.”61 As one scholar has written, an 
approach to rights that “privileges territorial sovereignty as the 
primary organizing principle of legal and political relations” 
remains highly influential in the conduct of sovereigns and the 
courts within them, despite scholarly recognition that “the reality 
of human interaction is chafing against the strictures our current 
conception of legal jurisdiction imposes.”62 She concludes that 
judges are unlikely to abandon a primary conception of territory 
as determining what domestic law constrains governments when 
they act outside their territory, while indicating that judges may 
occasionally seek to find a just resolution without overtly 
challenging the conceptual sway of territory.63 A deeply original 
and sophisticated examination of the historical relationship 
between geography and law, by Laura Benton, disrupts the 
narrative of law and territory as wedded through the assertion of 
sovereignty by empires, with law and cartography developing 
together as a rationalizing force.64 
With the passage of time, certain buried assumptions 
become less fixed than in a period when social understandings and 
practices obscured them. The example of marriage statutes written 
without specification of the sex of the participants is a simple 
example. Sexual difference as a requirement was unexamined and 
barely even assumed. Reproductive pairings were sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                     
POWER AND SPACE, supra note 14, at xiv-xv (relating Where is Law? to Who are We? 
and noting “[u]nacknowledged assumptions about space that work to stabilize the 
validity of seemingly obvious propositions, identities”). 
 61 Courts resist the invitation to extend rights defined domestically beyond 
their borders: 
The factors affecting a national court’s willingness to find that domestic 
rights reach beyond national borders in a particular case are, indisputably, 
multiple and complex. That said, this study reveals the perhaps surprising 
tenacity of country-based reasoning that privileges the role of territory, even 
in an age of “globalization.” Scholars, advocates, and policymakers would be 
well advised to take into account the stickiness of territorially based 
conceptions of domestic rights and obligations in proposing more expansive 
interpretations. 
Chimène I. Keitner, Rights Beyond Borders, 36 YALE J. INT’L L. 55, 58 (2011) 
(indicating “the entrenched political and legal significance of national boundaries”). 
 62 Id. at 63 (quoting Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 
151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 543 (2002)). 
 63 Id. at 57-58. 
 64 See BENTON, supra note 39, at xi-xii. 
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pervasive as a social pattern seemingly driven by basic biology—
gender as a binary associated with reproduction—that the legal 
grounding of marriage in gender went unnoticed. The potential 
malleability of the gendered body and of sexual attraction was not 
available for examination by lawmakers or judicial decision-
makers.65 For history, the implicit gender arrangements can be 
analyzed using a variety of interpretive approaches with elements 
of theory about power and the like, but the legal rules have 
needed little deeper theory or classification in connection with 
the binary assumptions about marital pairs. 
Until the assumption of sex as an organizing category for 
marriage was disturbed, the deeply embedded feature could bear 
the moral weight that, unexamined, it readily supported. After 
changes in technology made the variety in human sexual and 
family connections visible and open, the unstated parameter began 
to weaken, to require heated defense, and finally, to lose the moral 
force that made it persuasive. The disruption of an unseen part of 
legal rules has opened up the marriage category for new taxonomic 
work. Today, the gender feature of marriage plays a role at the 
entry stage that varies across jurisdictions66 and has placed in flux 
the mediating rules about obligations within marriage.67 Hence, the 
gender component of marriage can now attract a larger project to 
create a taxonomy of the role of gender, or gender replacements, in 
marriage. The universe of variation, however, remains contained 
within the category of marriage. 
Could place experience a similar exposure of its 
weakening logic in a world of mobility, instant communication 
severed from embodiment of the human person, newly understood 
historical complexities associated with the conquest of place and 
the assumed authority of a legal hierarchy over the local 
inhabitants,68 and skeptical treatment by scholars of control over 
territory as a basis for asserting authority?69 Is place amenable to 
refreshed taxonomic work in law that guides legal applications of 
logic relating to embodiment, location, or place metaphor? And is 
 
 65 JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE xxv (1995) 
(referring to heterosexuality as a “suppressed parameter” of the meaning of marriage 
in the modern West). 
 66 PETER NICOLAS & MIKE STRONG, THE GEOGRAPHY OF LOVE: SAME-SEX 
MARRIAGE & RELATIONSHIP RECOGNITION IN AMERICA (THE STORY IN MAPS) 9 (3d ed. 2013). 
 67 See James Herbie DiFonzo, Toward a Unified Field Theory of the Family: 
The American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. 
REV. 923, 923 (2001) (asserting that “[t]he task of bringing coherence and consistency 
to family law is truly daunting”). 
 68 RICHARD WHITE, THE MIDDLE GROUND: INDIANS, EMPIRES, AND REPUBLICS 
IN THE GREAT LAKE REGIONS, 1650-1815 xxv (2d ed. 2011). 
 69 See BENTON, supra note 39, at 30-33. 
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the fact that much of the mediation and reading of place arises 
from legislation rather than the development of common law an 
obstacle to a search for principles on which law can be 
rationalized and improved? This article seeks to answer these 
questions with an unequivocal yes, yes, and no. 
IV. PLACE AS METAPHOR: IDENTITY, PERCEPTION, MEMORY, 
POWER 
In contrast with assumptions about the gendered nature 
of marriage, place is both ubiquitous, as an unanalyzed 
background for legal doctrine, and nonobvious in the form of its 
various applications to law. Its influence is pervasive but 
unanalyzed as a category outside the specific topics in which it 
plays a role. Recognizing place as a feature of legal doctrine, 
incorporated without critical scrutiny or reflection, and thus, 
inconsistent in its logical role in different doctrines, invites an 
initial effort at taxonomy. One may, without an attempt to 
fashion a deep theory of place as an organizing perceptual or 
morally relevant category, begin to “map” the occurrence of 
place in law and to detect the way that place serves to allocate 
identity, blame, reward, movement, and haven. 
As brute fact, place is, as part of our cultural memory, a 
fact that dominates any vision of the human subject. As 
metaphor, it carries meaning associated with hierarchy (“power 
and place,” “high place,” “first place,” “a woman’s place is in the 
home”), social fit within a structure or in circumstance (“out of 
place,” “above one’s place,” “the wrong time and place,” “stay in 
your place,” “another place and time,” “place in the sun”), 
ownership or control (“my place,” “our place,” “holding a place,” 
“place holder”), and perspective (“Put yourself in my place,” “in a 
bad place”).70 Place, by means of design, is subject to alteration in 
ways that are subject to human agency while seeming not to be a 
product of agency. Hence, place molds the human subject by its 
totality and seemingly fixed character, even as the construction of 
place by agency and its unstated domination of legal categories 
is marginal as an overt subject of law. 
This role of place in affording comprehensibility renders it 
central to much legal doctrine. Its centrality is opaque, providing 
grounding for the legal imagination from hidden nooks in the 
abstractions that grow from assumptions of physical proximity or 
 
 70 Cresswell notes similar conversational uses of place. CRESSWELL, supra 
note 16, at 1-2. 
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distance, “meetings” of minds, proximate cause, a duty to retreat, 
an arm’s length negotiation, or a right to stand your ground. Here 
I attempt an orienting statement about place in legal materials: 
Place connects human perception to basic features of existential, 
or concrete, contact with an outside actor, force, or location, 
ordinarily through physical proximity but, possibly, through 
imaginary proximity.71  
A. Staking Claims of Sovereignty 
Place grounds views about sovereignty, moral claims 
over territory, the status of the occupants of a claimed territory, 
and nationhood as defined by physical expanse. Today, affinity 
groups often have stronger bonds of loyalty and commonality than 
do collections of human beings who share a physical location. Yet 
citizenship and nationhood remain defined by location in much of 
the contemporary imagination. The online game Cyber Nations 
unreflectively announces: 
Cyber Nations is a free persistent browser-based nation simulation 
game. Create a nation and decide how you will rule your people by 
choosing a government type, a national religion, tax rate and more. 
Build your nation according to your choosing by purchasing 
infrastructure to support your citizens, land to expand your borders, 
technology to increase your effectiveness, and military to defend your 
national interests. 
Develop improvements for your nation such as harbors to enhance 
your ability to trade with other nations, build clinics and hospitals to 
increase your total population, and invest in schools and universities 
to increase your people’s literacy rate. Finance national wonders like 
great temples and monuments for your citizens to marvel at, develop 
movie industries to increase your population’s happiness, or expand 
beyond the confines of this world by building colonies on the moon 
and mars [sic] to open up rich opportunities for your nation. It’s all 
up to you.72 
While nations are mainly physical and bounded, 
metaphor has helped to define the human in terms of place. 
The fifteenth century mystic and jurist Nicolas of Cusa used a 
metaphor of man as a cosmographer, or mapmaker, and his 
mind as a city73 with gates through which the senses entered.74 
 
 71 Note that Creswell describes “imaginary place” as having “imaginary 
materiality.” Id. at 1. 
 72 CYBER NATIONS: A NATION SIMULATION GAME, http://www.cybernations.net/ 
(last visited July 5, 2013) (emphasis added). 
 73 VICTORIA MORSE, THE MAP AS A METAPHOR FOR ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE BY 
NICHOLAS OF CUSA (1999) (translating and commenting on NICHOLAS OF CUSA, 
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As a mystic, Cusa had a larger goal than theorizing sensory 
input,75 but his core idea depended on an understanding of a 
human being as a situated “city” with gates, indicating 
proximity to something that could enter the gates, and 
dependent on the senses to process the world. Place was 
dominant for such a conception of the human subject. 
The American mystic Ralph Waldo Emerson similarly 
focused on the organ for sight—the transparent eyeball. Unlike 
Cusa, Emerson began to hover above the situatedness of the 
single sense that he named as primary to the human soul. 
Emerson anticipated, with his experimental treatment of 
something he called the Over-soul, the fragmentation and 
simultaneous expansion of human subjectivity from grounding 
in a physical place. Emerson evoked an abstracted location 
created by a common human access to thought, transmitted 
without direct contact yet defining of the human subject. 
Rather than Cusa’s city with gates, Emerson imagined a 
universal eye, roaming across time and place. Emerson’s 
writing is devoid of writing about law. Yet his conception of the 
possible form human connection might take prefigures the 
impact of technological change on human consciousness as an 
unembodied merger of minds.76 
The Over-soul may not have legal problems, but the 
hovering Cloud of the late computer age brings collisions of 
legal interests that would dismay the genteel Emerson’s 
aspirations for a unified human understanding without direct 
contact among the human composition of the unity. At the same 
time, Emerson’s preference for abstraction had implications for 
how the concrete world, in its physical proximities, could establish 
embodied institutions meriting respect or direct engagement. In 
his sense of removal from engagement, Emerson foreshadowed a 
possibility of place receding as a guiding concept for legal 
obligation or moral imperative. 
Finally, a second American “mystic,” President Abraham 
Lincoln, offered a reading of a nation that relied on an insistence 
on a deep moral component of territorial bounding: 
                                                                                                                                     
COMPENDIUM ch. VIII (1464)), available at http://www.geography.wisc.edu/histcart/
broadsht/brdsht7c.pdf.  
 74 NICHOLAS OF CUSA, COMPENDIUM ch. VIII (1464), available at 
http://www.geography.wisc.edu/histcart/broadsht/brdsht7.html. 
 75 Id. 
 76 RALPH WALDO EMERSON, THE OVER-SOUL (1841), reprinted in SELF-
RELIANCE AND OTHER ESSAYS 51-64 (Stanley Appelbaum ed., 1993). 
2014] RESTATEMENT OF PLACE 779 
 
A nation may be said to consist of its territory, its people, and its 
laws. The territory is the only part which is of certain durability. 
“One generation passeth away and another generation cometh, but 
the earth abideth forever.” It is of the first importance to duly 
consider and estimate this ever-enduring part.77 
Such a claim must be evoking/invoking the part of 
historical memory that is thought a defining feature of a place; for 
Lincoln, a claim of memory must have been implicit, yet the 
memory Lincoln invoked was of a duration that commenced with 
conquest and then with a compact.78 So the background legal and 
mystical phenomenology of nations relies upon a sovereign power 
that places a boundary around the claims of place-memory and 
clothes that power in moral garments and legal order.79 
Dissents from such claims take legal, cultural, and literary 
forms in terms of assertions of individual rights, indigenous 
rights, guerilla warfare, treaties that give indigenous peoples 
partial status as nations within nations, the designation of sacred 
places (evoking memory), and subtle analyses of what gives a 
person “a human claim” to a place.80 The assertion that settlers 
 
 77 Abraham Lincoln, President of the United States, Second Annual Message 
to the Senate and House of Representatives (Dec. 1, 1862), available at 
http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/detail/3737; ABRAHAM LINCOLN: HIS 
SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 676 (Roy P. Basler ed., Da Capo Press 2001). 
 78 GEORGE M. FREDERICKSON, THE INNER CIVIL WAR: NORTHERN 
INTELLECTUALS AND THE CRISIS OF THE UNION 130-50 (Illini Books ed., 1993) 
(concerning competing theories of the nation as an organic body or a product of consent 
subject to the withdrawal of consent). 
 79 Perhaps Lincoln’s meaning about time and place can be translated by a 
contemporary European thinker: 
As legal norms are posited from the first-person plural perspective, they 
situate human behaviour in the temporal arc spanning the past, present, and 
future of a collective. These modes of time are irreducible to calendar time. 
The unity of calendar time manifests itself as the continuum of a before and 
an after; by contrast, past, present, and future only appear as a unity to the 
extent that the members of a collective mutually engage in action with a view 
to realising their common interest: we now “y” to be able to “z” later on, given 
that “x” took place. Past, present, and future are sutured into the history of a 
“we” through mutual interaction in the framework of a common project. 
Because a determinate common interest manifests itself temporally in the 
form of a determinate common project, historical time is common in the 
twofold sense of a time that is shared by, and distinguishes, the members of a 
collective. Precisely for this reason, legal orders unfold a bounded 
temporality. In this fundamental sense of the term, the bounded time of a 
polity conditions its use of calendar time when setting dates, and in that 
sense temporal limits, to human action.  
Hans Lindahl, A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries, in GLOBAL 
DEMOCRACY AND EXCLUSION 123 (Ronald Tinnevelt & Helder de Schutter eds., 2010). 
 80 Adam Gopnik, Facing History: Why We Love Camus, NEW YORKER, Apr. 9, 
2012, at 70-76. 
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have a “human claim” to a place challenges the views of the left 
about the moral significance of place as the property—perhaps 
even sacred property—of native peoples. Yet, illegal immigrants 
to America and other places are in the class the left favors, while 
such “settlers” are accused of trying to colonize America. Illegal 
immigrants are treated in rhetoric as “invaders,” engaged in 
conquest,81 and, by contrast, as persons with a moral right to 
mobility.82 For the purposes of immigration by the impoverished, 
the right treats immigration in large numbers, if unauthorized, as 
a form of invasion of the kind of sovereignty invoked by duration-
defined place-memory exemplified in Lincoln’s Second Inaugural. 
The left sees such mass movements as the inherent human right to 
movement and the shelter of place, and the asylum place can 
afford, from menaces made by nature and by sovereign power.83 In 
a switch of perspective, the right sees the settling of America as a 
heroic story of conquest of the unknown, followed by a manifest 
destiny to control territory, and the left sees the founding of 
America as steeped in blood, savagery, and theft of land.84 
Contemporary doubts and early European debates about 
the status of a nation, expressed in the language of 
interdisciplinary probing of the theoretical basis for authority,85 
                                                                                                                                     
Camus felt as deeply for the seeming oppressor as for the oppressed. He 
grasped that the great majority of the settlers in any country, and in Algeria 
in particular, were as much victims of the circumstances as the locals, and 
made the same claims on decency and empathy. They were for the most part 
not rootless colonists who had come for the main buck—and those who were 
would be replaced by a local boss class. Colonialism is wrong, but the human 
claims of the colonists are just as real as those of the colonized. No human 
being is more indigenous to a place than any other. This remains an 
unfashionable, even taboo, position; one feels it still, for instance, in the 
condescension that American leftists offer white South Africans.  
Id. at 76. 
 81 Elizabeth McCormick, The Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection 
Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act: Blowing Off Steam or Setting Wildfires?, 23 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 293, 296, 336-37 (2009) (describing anti-immigrant sentiment in 
Oklahoma and citing stories using the terms “invaders” and “colonize”). 
 82 See, e.g., Francis A. Gabor, The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 
1986: An Analysis in the Light of Contemporary International Law, 23 INT’L LAW. 485, 
485-86 (1989) (discussing the fundamental human freedom to “move across national 
boundaries”). 
 83 See McCormick, supra note 81, at 296, 337. 
 84 For a critical treatment of the versions of the past embraced by writers 
who celebrate the settling of areas by an “invading population” that overwhelms, 
destroys, and colonizes the indigenous peoples, see DAVID E. STANNARD, AMERICAN 
HOLOCAUST: THE CONQUEST OF THE NEW WORLD 3-15 (1992). 
 85 There is a large body of interdisciplinary material subjecting ideas about 
sovereignty and territory to skeptical exploration and simple conceptual probing based 
upon the growing complications of describing authority as single and comprehensive in 
a world that produces law-like norms and systems of governance not tied to territory. 
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have counterparts in nineteenth century debates about 
nationhood. In Lincoln’s time, there was open contestation of the 
claim to a territorial imperative that made the United States a 
union that had to be indissoluble. Nathaniel Hawthorne did not 
accept the idea of one nation for which blood should be shed to 
maintain its territorial form.86 Further, Americans in the 
nineteenth century faced confusion about the kind of territorial 
claim that could be maintained over a landmass in which the idea 
of an organic nation based on tradition and kingly power has been 
supplanted by the consent of the governed.87 The consent of the 
governed placed individuals acting collectively in charge of their 
destiny as part of a nation; how could a government formed in 
revolution and with a theory of consent by its inhabitants claim a 
right to the loyalty of citizens in a region that no longer wished to 
maintain the tie?88 
                                                                                                                                     
For an intriguing exploration of the increasingly global complexity in sources of legal 
mandates, see Larry Catá Backer, The Structural Characteristics of Global Law for the 
21st Century: Fracture, Fluidity, Permeability, and Polycentricity, 17 TILBURG L. REV. 
177, 177 (2012) (asserting that “[g]lobal law can be understood as the systematization 
of anarchy, as the management of a loosely intertwined universe of autonomous 
governance frameworks operating dynamically across borders and grounded in 
functional differentiation among governance communities”). 
 86 For Hawthorne’s generally disdainful attitude toward the importance of 
preserving the Union in its territorial form, see DANIEL AARON, THE UNWRITTEN WAR: 
AMERICAN WRITERS AND THE CIVIL WAR 41-55 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1973). Aaron, 
seeing through Hawthorne’s eyes, refers to the Union as “that manmade, unnatural 
contrivance.” Id. at 42. 
 87 FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 130-50, explores the debate among 
adherents of “an essentially liberal” view of the prerogatives of the state, typified by 
Francis Lieber; the theorists of a contractual view of the establishment of the Union 
typified by John L. O’Sullivan, with the seceding states withdrawing the consent of 
“the great mass of population” in those states; and revived conservative views on 
loyalism that appealed to a “divine right” view of government, typified by Horace 
Bushnell and derived from an “instinct which attaches us to our native country.” Lieber 
sought to capture the idea of a difference between a people, which was “merely the 
aggregate of the inhabitants of a territory without any additional idea” and a nation, 
which “implies a homogenous population, inhabiting a coherent territory; a population 
having a common language, literature, institutions, and ‘an organic unity with one 
another, as well as being conscious of a common destiny.’” CHARLES EDWARD MERRIAM, 
A HISTORY OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THEORIES 297 (1903) (characterizing and quoting 
Lieber). Merriam explains that, though not always clearly expressed, this view became 
dominant as an intellectual rationale for the Civil War, with a sense that, despite 
American revolutionary origins, “the nation [was] an organic product, the result of an 
evolutionary process.” Id. at 297. 
 88 In M’Culloch v.Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 403 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall 
contemplated how the mass of individuals who consented to the Constitution related to 
place, in a manner that offered an overt theory of the necessity and simultaneous 
unimportance of place as critical legal fact: 
This mode of proceeding [to adopt the Constitution] was adopted; and by the 
Convention, by Congress, and by the State Legislatures, the instrument was 
submitted to the people. They acted upon it in the only manner in which they 
can act safely, effectively, and wisely, on such a subject, by assembling in 
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Nineteenth century thinkers struggled with finding a 
rationale for the use of force to prevent a region’s secession from 
the constitutional order that claimed a territorial domain.89 The 
previous lack of a sense of nationhood became apparent, with the 
result that theories about loyalty as a first requirement of 
citizenship were developed, and organizations such as the Union 
League Club were formed, to articulate and reinforce the idea of 
union.90 The narrative of nationhood became unreflective. The 
territorial definition of the United States as a nation consisting of 
a landmass with subunits that were permanent in political and 
geographic form became an unshakeable and unremarked 
assumption. The formerly sovereign nations of the native peoples 
were subsumed by the territorial sovereignty that permitted 
treaties to be adjudged by only one party to the treaty, that is, the 
party in control of the entire landmass.91 
Today, new visionaries and individualists look for the 
Over-soul in the virtual world, in which states, defined and 
measured by landmass, lose relative power over small populations 
that do not consent to the territorial basis of the laws imposed on 
them, where territory is determined by defined portions of the 
physical world.92 
Place potentially moves more decisively into the 
imagination, a collective vision that can take form online in 
symbolic form; the place is the collective mind of those who 
envision a City liberated from power created by the brute physical 
world. The city is occupied by the input of its self-selected 
inhabitants, who fill it with the meanings and laws that might 
                                                                                                                                     
Convention. It is true, they assembled in their several States—and where else 
should they have assembled? No political dreamer was ever wild enough to 
think of breaking down the lines which separate the States, and of 
compounding the American people into one common mass. Of consequence, 
when they act, they act in their States. But the measures they adopt do not, 
on that account, cease to be the measures of the people themselves, or become 
the measures of the State governments. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 89 See FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 76-77 (contrasting Bushnell’s 
conservative views critical of the Declaration of Independence as a wrong democratic 
principle conducive to the Civil War with Wendell Phillips’s fears that the war was 
justifying anti-democratic, authoritarian impulses). 
 90 See FREDERICKSON, supra note 78, at 131. 
 91 See Osofsky, supra note 35, at 129 (explaining that a Western Soshone 
family whose lands are being expropriated by the United States “are trapped inside a 
legal system in which the expropriator evaluates and validates its own expropriation 
with minimal responsiveness to external condemnation of its behavior”). Osofsky refers 
to the rejection by the United States of international treaty-based interventions as a 
claim to control a “distinct sociolegal space.” Id. at 149. 
 92 See SCHMIDT & COHEN, supra note 58, at 101. 
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govern a secessionist physical location. A virtual world claims a 
place as an alternative to physical place, inhabited by emigrants 
from the literalism of authority based on physical proximity, and, 
today, by claimed sovereignty over bounded territory, to the 
voluntarism of a chosen citizenship in a nation assembled within 
the virtual reality lodged in the Cloud. The visual and sensory 
connection to the world suggested by Cusa’s metaphor of the 
human being as a city with gates has been93 and will be 
increasingly undercut by technology that separates human 
beings from un-chosen sensory input and allows them to create 
a sensory environment from the virtual world, or from 
avocations that supplant the need to observe one’s 
surroundings. In the twentieth century, skyscrapers severed 
their occupants from contact with nature or street life and 
placed them in controlled environments that had little that was 
supplied by the spontaneous and random events of an urban 
place. It was a cliché of twentieth century writing that the 
occupants of such towers lost contact, in their work life or their 
transportation from work to home, with poverty or urban 
chaos. They used superhighways or trains to go from a tower to 
a suburb, which was designed to give controlled contact with 
nature and refuge from contact with different classes.94 Yet the 
city of collective perception can be reconstructed in an 
imagined place, a factor that keeps the metaphor of place a 
strong presence in conceptions of shared experience.95 
B. Place in Motion 
The car has simultaneously connected drivers to the 
physical world and created means of escape from place as 
primary.96 The inside of a car is a place that can influence or even 
define one’s identity. “Automobility” has helped Americans to 
equate the idea of freedom with mobility, or, more pungently, to 
 
 93 See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74. 
 94 A review of the comic treatment of New York City in the 1980s in TOM 
WOLFE, THE BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES (1987) captures the sense of insulation purchased in 
the city. Frank Conroy, Urban Rats in Fashion’s Maze, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 1987), available 
at http://www.nytimes.com/books/98/12/06/specials/wolfe-bonfire.html (reviewing Bonfire 
and summing up the main character, an investment banker who “lives in the middle of 
New York City without knowing New York City”). 
 95 See infra notes 116-36 and accompanying text (discussing place 
conceptions relating to abortion regulations). 
 96 For a darker view of the cultural significance of cars, see Carol Sanger, 
Girls and the Getaway: Cars, Culture, and the Predicament of Gendered Space, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 705, 711 (1995) (suggesting that a woman’s sharing of space in a car with a 
man is viewed as automatically consenting to sex). 
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“assert[ ]  motion to be the epitome, and not simply one possible 
dimension, of freedom.”97 Ambiguities about the evolution and 
cultural meanings of place converge with the car. Cars connect 
people to place but also sever them from place because they are 
always moving.98 But cars are becoming more self-contained, and 
as the trend toward driverless cars continues, cars are more and 
more their own place. The car is a microcosm of a transformation 
of place, complete with legal and cultural consequences.99 
For automobility, or the experience of freedom understood 
as autonomous motion, the next phase in automobile technology 
and user behavior will render the body passive while in motion 
and in private transportation. The process of simultaneously 
escaping place and choosing and seeing place will become distant 
from the human subject. Driverless cars will carry human 
 
 97 COTTEN SEILER, REPUBLIC OF DRIVERS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF 
AUTOMOBILITY IN AMERICA 149 (2008). 
 98 In one passage, CRESSWELL, supra note 16, at 7 says that a place is a 
space, or location, “which people have madel . . . a meaningful location.” The 
relationship of the car to much of “space” is highly impersonal and transient. 
Superhighways long ago severed car travel from a strong connection to place, even 
disrupting local understandings of a meaningful location. Railroads have had similar 
effects on a large scale. Richard White has argued that a premature development of 
railroads reconfigured space, created a hitherto unimagined “spatial politics,” and gave 
motion pride of place over the senses that dwell on the local. “The railroads made space 
political by making the quotidian experience of place one of rapid movement. A railroad 
train in motion was a snorting, smoking, roaring thing; for all the beauty of its movement, it 
was an assault on the human senses, which registered that it was the train’s movement 
that mattered.” RICHARD WHITE, RAILROADED: THE TRANSCONTINENTALS AND THE MAKING 
OF MODERN AMERICA 141 (2011). 
 99 For a striking evocation, by contrast, of the impact of modern forms of 
travel in both exploring space and concealing the texture of places, see GRAHAM ROBB, 
THE DISCOVERY OF FRANCE: A HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE 
FIRST WORLD WAR (2007). As a purported expert on France, Robb discovered “the 
uncharted interior” that is another, undiscovered and incompletely mapped France 
compared with the image of France “pieced together” in political transitions and from a 
perspective dominated by images of Paris and “a few powerful individuals.” Id. at xv-
xvii. The means of his discovery, and then historical exploration of, a terra incognita of 
France was the bicycle. Traveling by bicycle, Robb discovered a France that maps have 
not been capable of capturing—“the more accurate the map, the more misleading the 
impression.” Id. at 6. 
A bicycle unrolls a 360-degree panorama of the land, allows the rider to 
register its gradual changes in gear ratios and muscle tension, and makes it 
hard to miss a single inch of it . . . . The itinerary of a cyclist recreates, as if 
by chance, much older journeys: transhumance trails, Gallo-Roman trade 
routes, pilgrim paths, river confluences that have disappeared in industrial 
wasteland, valleys and ridge roads that used to be busy with pedlars and 
migrants. Cycling also makes conversation easy and inevitable—with 
children, nomads, people who are lost, local amateur historians and, of 
course, dogs . . . . 
Id. at xvi. 
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subjects100 immersed in the virtual world at their fingertips and 
confined to a space that lacks sufficient sensory input to assert 
the claims of a proximate physical place over subjectivity or 
one’s experience of physical vulnerability.101 
In addition, unanticipated effects will reorder features 
of public policy, such as revenue sources for cities.102 In such 
horseless and driverless carriages, the brute fact of place as a 
source of legal obligation, self-definition, or limitation will fade. 
The legal ramifications of design that relieve human actors of the 
risks attendant on personal agency in physical place will 
gradually emerge from policy making and legal reasoning, as 
fewer unguided autonomous actions are necessary to accomplish 
basic tasks.103 As suggested by analysts of system architecture, 
some forms of legal regulation and retrospective accountability 
can recede as forms of choice disappear from the transparent 
and undesigned physical world.104 
Thus, an attempt to organize a Restatement of law 
around place is both a rich entry point into law and elusive to 
capture as a legal topic. Unlike the study of special collections of 
standard subsets of law, such as sports law or construction law, 
the law of place is not a set of standard doctrines affecting an 
activity. Rather, place is the unstated premise of much of law. 
Places organize the operative parts of a legal question; locutions 
take forms of place metaphor or they overtly use measurements of 
space to define duties and rights, and find facts of legal import. 
Courts now take judicial notice of Google maps as a basis for a 
 
 100 Nick Bilton, Disruptions: How Driverless Cars Could Reshape Cities, N.Y. 
TIMES (July 7, 2013), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/07/disruptions-how-driverless-
cars-could-reshape-cities/ (“I could sleep in my driverless car, or have an exercise bike in 
the back of the car to work out on the way to work.” (quoting Bryant Walker Smith, a 
fellow at the Center for Internet and Society at Stanford Law School and a member of 
the Center for Automotive Research at Stanford)). 
 101 See Paul Stenquist, Nissan Announces Plan to Release Driverless Cars by 2020, 
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2013), http://wheels.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/08/29/nissan-announces-
plans-to-release-driverless-cars-by-2020/ (noting the questions of driver loss of skills and 
apportionment of liability between manufacturers and “vehicle occupants”). 
 102 Nick Bilton, The Money Side of Driverless Cars, N.Y. TIMES (July 9, 2013, 1:36 
PM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/09/the-end-of-parking-tickets-drivers-and-car-
insurance/; see also Assemb. B. 511, 2011 Leg., 76th Sess. (Nev. 2011), available at 
http://www.leg.state.nv.us/Session/76th2011/Bills/AB/AB511_EN.pdf (defining autonomous 
vehicles and providing for their regulation). 
 103 “Neither human error nor human nature will interfere with your gratingly 
perfect morning.” Janet Maslin, Formatting a World with No Secrets: ‘The New Digital 
Age,’ by Eric Schmidt and Jared Cohen, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2013, at C31, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/26/books/the-new-digital-age-by-eric-schmidt-and-
jared-cohen.html. 
 104 See Tien, supra note 55, at 5-7. 
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fact finding about distances.105 Law assumes how a human subject 
operates, and in turn assumes there is a formative influence that 
gives comprehensibility to the subject on which the law imposes 
its commands. Place is the always-lurking formative influence, 
arraying critical meanings around the legal subject. 
V. RESTATING PLACE: CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES 
Evolving understandings of place are a source of 
orientation to the features of the world that organize perceptions. 
These evolving understandings, as well as abstract meanings of 
place in dimensions of personal definition, underlie moral 
domains and suggest that place can be an organizing topic for a 
Restatement. This Restatement would serve to both capture 
features of existing law and propose avenues for law reform and 
adaptation. The question to explore, then, is the utility of 
undertaking such a compilation. Is place too abstract a concept 
to merit special attention to its range, its place in law, and its 
applications? Does a compilation reveal a larger theme about 
place that calls for systematic examination, analytic challenge, 
and reconfiguring the assumptions on which law rests 
concerning the physical configuration of the world and its 
metaphorical extensions into claims of legal force? How might 
it be organized?106 
The rules that demand measurement of distances and the 
doctrines that configure persona, and the tropes that conjure a 
location for a legally relevant act or regulation (the public square, 
the marketplace, standing one’s “ground”), draw upon 
unelaborated uses of ideas about real proximity and ideas about 
 
 105 See McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1008 n.1 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 106 LAW AND GEOGRAPHY (Jane Holder & Carolyn Harrison eds., 2003). LAW 
AND GEOGRAPHY contains the following parts (aside from introduction): Boundaries; 
Land; Property; Nature; Identity, People, Persons, and Places; Culture and Time; 
Knowledge. In Spatial Dimensions of Private Law, contributors Nick Jackson and John 
Wightman attempt to narrow the scope of the factor in law of space by excluding “rights . . . 
[that] are defined in a wholly spatial way,” such as, in their view, “chattels, the personal 
rights to bodily integrity in the tort of negligence and the intentional torts, and intellectual 
property rights.” Id. at 35. Given the fluid meanings of space and place, and their 
metaphoric character in the cultural and legal imagination, such an exclusion is not 
manageable for reducing the scope and abstractness of the whole topic. Jackson and 
Wightman seek to identify and “explore the spatial dimensions of private law which are 
detectable in the law itself . . . .” Id. For this article, the suggestion is that some topics 
that might be restated present themselves overtly as about little but a place: the law of 
garages, rules about minimum space in a prison cell, property lines, zoning, and so 
forth. Those are the parts of a restatement of place that are the most straightforward 
for compilation from existing treatises, but not the defining limit of the law to be 
understood and analyzed. 
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aspects of the world that require a conception of place as the 
forum in which acts occur and may be assigned significance. 
A. Legal Subject Status: Who Are We? 
At a macro-level, territory imposes identities on the 
occupants that vary according to the assertion by some claimant 
over the landmass to possession of legal authority. Benton 
describes the effects of colonization by conquest on the 
development of an order that does not depend on the creation and 
enforcement of a uniform law,107 but which has the capacity to re-
define the identity of the inhabitants of the landmass108 and to 
lead some of them to become bureaucratic mediators between the 
law of the claimant and the local customs in specific locales.109 
1. Mapping Moral Inches 
In Gonzales v. Carhart, the Supreme Court sought to 
determine whether a form of abortion that requires the exit of a 
fetal head from the birth canal before surgical destruction of 
the fetus could be banned, though destruction of the same fetus 
would be legal if done before the fetus had emerged from the 
birth canal.110 Issues included an “undue burden” on pregnant 
persons for whom the contested form might be a preferred 
alternative for preserving child-bearing capacity, and adequate 
notice to a physician regarding the criminal prohibition of the 
legally disfavored method. In his opinion, borrowing a term from 
anatomy designed to trace the common ancestry of organisms in 
different species, Justice Kennedy analogized the female body to 
mapped terrain.111 “Marks” on a map define the prohibited and 
the permitted on the basis of physical enclosure; one may commit 
an act legally within the bounded space but not inches outside 
that space. “Anatomical landmarks” read into the interior of an 
abstracted body, a body existing in a judicial text with an 
evocation of geography absent from physical embodiment, a 
meaning about activity within and outside the boundaries of a 
place. The interior of a female body is given legal meaning as a 
place, within which acts may be legal though mediated by legal 
 
 107 BENTON, supra note 39, at 9. 
 108 Id. at 14-15. 
 109 See generally id. 
 110 Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007). 
 111 Id. at 147 (holding that the ban is not void for vagueness and does not 
impose an undue burden). 
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regulation and without which the same act is homicide. The 
difference in inches is given heavy moral significance to justify the 
altered legal definition112 of an act otherwise the same except for a 
small difference in the place it occurs.113 Yet the difference 
appears to rise to the level of a demarcation of state jurisdiction; if 
a fetus is destroyed within a female’s body, neither the state nor 
the citizenry has “seen” the act, and thus the state has a weaker 
claim to jurisdiction.114 Further, the mapping of the female body, 
using “anatomical landmarks,” provides adequate notice to a 
physician of the territory of the state’s jurisdiction; the physician 
may plan an excursion within a bounded space with sufficient 
precision to remain securely inside the boundaries of a less 
regulated domain. Yet the female body produces ambiguities that 
make mapping legal boundaries uncertain, as it once made a 
medieval treatise, On the Secrets of Women (De Secretis 
Mulierum), problematic for the form of discourse in the Middle 
Ages about secrecy and monsters.115 
The terminology of anatomical landmarks, though used 
as a claim about “due process” for physicians and thus about 
“undue burden” for pregnant persons, nonetheless echoes a 
conception of the mind as a city116 with gates through which the 
senses enter.117 The visibility and entrance into the mind’s gate of 
a fetus by its passing an anatomical landmark defined by the 
boundary of the female body render the circumstance of an 
aborted birth a legal moment different from the less fraught legal 
moment that might occur fractions of an inch earlier in the 
interior of the female body. Place supports the mapping of moral 
inches, with the severest legal consequence driven by moral 
condemnation arising from the passage, through the gate, and 
into the senses. Indeed, Justice Kennedy is keen to protect the 
physician from the reputational effects118 of doing an act that can 
be imagined as being in a quasi-public space that most of the 
alarmed “observers” would never enter for direct observation or 
 
 112 Id. at 141. 
 113 Id. at 139, 147-48. 
 114 Id. at 181 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 
914, 930 (2000)) Comparing the disallowed procedure from the permitted one, Justice 
Ginsburg writes, “The law saves not a single fetus from destruction, for it targets only 
a method of performing abortion.” 
 115 SARAH ALISON MILLER, MEDIEVAL MONSTROSITY AND THE FEMALE BODY 56 
(2010) (“Although the disclosure of women’s secrets depends on the legibility of the 
female body, the instability of its corporeal borders and the ambiguity of its 
superfluities trouble the text’s claim over this semantic field.”). 
 116 See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74. 
 117 See supra Part IV. 
 118 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 157. 
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even witness by remote visual means. Thus, place assumes a role 
as a public space by virtue of the hypothetical witnessing of an 
act not hidden within the physical female’s bodily domain. 
The glimpse afforded by a citizen’s imaginary viewing of 
an event in an exterior space becomes legally dispositive. 
Presumably, even if the physician allowed no other direct witness 
of the act, and used techniques that obscured his own glimpse of 
the critical legal moment, as it is obscured by abortions completed 
within the now-zoned space of the body, the space outside the 
body demarked by an anatomical landmark would be imagined as 
one in which events occurring in it are visually disturbing and 
hence an odious presence in the “city” of the legal and layman’s 
mind. For the fraught moment mapped by Justice Kennedy’s 
exploration of the female body, the interior of the female body is 
left as an unobserved “non-space.” Recent shifts in legal 
regulation have sought to reclaim that space for the “city.”119 
In the concluding part of the article, I will propose a 
concrete approach to a statement of principles to guide law-making 
in the context of regulating reproduction. My approach will address 
place as the primary subject of such regulations in the broader 
context of the provision of medical services to a patient. 
2. More Moral Inches 
Recent efforts at opening a new space within the female 
body that is observable within the city have occurred with the 
enactment of mandatory sonogram laws that require pregnant 
women to view a sonogram of a fetus before an abortion can be 
provided. Such a law seeks to relocate the concealed space of 
the female body into a public zone of possible observation, and 
render it potentially disturbing to the compelled viewer and to 
the constructed imagined gaze of the citizenry on both the 
compelled viewer and the contents of the female interior. The 
female interior becomes a new site of exploration, depiction, 
narrative, and claims of sovereignty by means of discovery and 
report. Technology allows the reclaiming of the territory as 
interior, as by the use of a morning-after pill or a pill that 
induces a medical abortion. In the most aggressive reclaiming 
of place as concealed and private, some women order the pill 
online for mailing to their homes.120 
 
 119 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 120 Dawn Stacey, Women Are Buying Home Abortion Pills Online . . . , 
ABOUT.COM (Dec. 3, 2009), http://contraception.about.com/b/2009/12/03/women-are-
buying-home-abortion-pills-online.htm. 
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The respect for privacy in a home is a factor in the 
cultural willingness to evade restrictive laws by initiating a 
medical abortion in their homes.121 But the home is not a fully 
private site for women who abort; there is no protective doctrine 
allowing termination of a pregnancy in the privacy of the home 
comparable to the constitutional doctrine that protects the 
possession of pornography in the home.122 Yet, in the past, the 
practice of abortion was heavily private. Abortion discussions 
substantially occurred in private spheres such as the home or a 
medical office and recognition was common that women grounded 
their claim to a need in a direct, unmediated experience of their 
own bodies.123 In a self-protective maneuver, however, the 
medical profession in the twentieth century began to report 
cases of women who sought help for infections brought about by 
home or underground abortions.124 
Today, place has been reconfigured to allow for (1) 
discursive mapping of the female body by judicial mandarins for 
the gaze of readers, (2) opening the interior of the female body as 
a public venue for enforced viewing by individual women and an 
imagined collective, and, finally, (3) some recovery of privacy of 
and autonomy over the female body, through the availability of 
pills that induce medical abortions.125 The female body is, in the 
modern-day equivalent of medieval texts, a site of “semantic 
indeterminacy”126 for which solutions are sought based on 
conceptions of place—”anatomical landmarks,” enforced 
 
 121 Id. To warn that the home use of the pill can create a risk of an incomplete 
abortion and possible infection, women explain to other women that seeking medical 
attention for a miscarriage should be routine and reliable. 
 122 For a treatment of the exposure of pregnant women to criminal sanctions, 
including a case arising from a spontaneous abortion or miscarriage in the privacy of a 
home, and restraint of physical liberty to relocate a pregnant woman to a place in 
which she lacks all privacy, including a right of bodily integrity, see Lynn M. Paltrow & 
Jeanne Flavin, The Policy and Politics of Reproductive Health: Arrests of and Forced 
Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–2005: Implications for 
Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 299, 308 (2013); 
see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (constitutional protection for 
possession of obscenity in the home, though the material was legally obscene under 
state law). 
 123 LESLIE REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE AND LAW 
IN THE UNITED STATES, 1867–1973 at 8 (1997) (explaining that “the popular ethic regarding 
abortion and common law were grounded in the female experience of their own bodies”). 
 124 Id. at 60, 120 (explaining how the American Medical Association began to 
recommend that women seeking abortions be handed over by physicians to the police 
and how physicians were pressured to report and obtain evidence from women patients 
suffering from a badly done abortion). 
 125 Place in the nineteenth century provided ample opportunity for privacy by 
women seeking to avoid a pregnancy before quickening. REAGAN, supra note 123, at 9 
(describing herbs used by women to create an abortion). 
 126 MILLER, supra note 115, at 71. 
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sonograms to make the female interior readable by a pregnant 
woman who becomes the primary participant in a shared viewing, 
and, most directly and literally, the alteration of the physical 
enclosures in which an activity protected as “private” can occur. 
The alteration is meant to render the exercise of a right of 
privacy less secluded and to expose the “patient” in need of 
regulated service by placing her in a space that is designed127 to 
prevent seclusion.128 Laws enacted by legislators with male 
majorities, such as The Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996,129 constitute a re-shaping of place—
not merely that of the female body as a private interior, as 
assumed and implicitly conceded by Justice Kennedy, but of 
the places for the rendering of service to the anatomic 
female130—and an interpreting of a body through the gate of 
shared, legally privileged perceptions that situate observation, 
disapproval, and regulatory scope. 
In this conception of place, the female body is made a 
part of a “semantic field” that a “text” would claim131 a “place-
centered” text of a kind for which the male body lacks a 
counterpart. This use of place as an unreflective intuition is a 
 
 127 Tien, supra note 55. Tien explains that much design that asserts control over 
conduct is concealed and hence a means of enforcing legally relevant preferences through 
design. The effort to “redesign” the available spaces for legal abortion is not hidden, but, should 
the effort succeed, the capacity of architecture to reshape cultural possibilities would gain force, 
as the locations in which women may exercise their right of “privacy” become state 
architecture, monitored and controlled. The outcome may well be shaped by culturally vigorous 
counter-conceptions of “women’s” space and the malleability of place—internet communication, 
mobility, subterranean markets, self-help in places shielded from the domain of a claimed 
public place—as well as by political mobilization to restore a law of women’s place for control of 
their reproductive capacity. The idea of place is potentially a useful rubric for counter-
mobilization under the banner of the home, and extensions of a home atmosphere, as a private 
place for control of the sexed body. The feminist concern with “safe spaces” is a natural 
rhetorical response, built around place as a legally relevant construct, to the movement toward 
legal re-imagining of place to remap the female body for regulation of female reproduction. 
 128 For example, Idaho enacted a set of statutory criminal prohibitions forbidding 
“any person,” read by a prosecutor to apply to self-abortion, to perform an abortion without 
strict adherence to regulations designed for physicians. Idaho Code section 18-606, directly 
applicable to pregnant women, subjected “[e]very woman who knowingly submits to an 
abortion or solicits of another, for herself, the production of an abortion, or who purposely 
terminates her own pregnancy otherwise than by a live birth” to felony charges. IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-606 (2013). The exception was if the abortion were performed as permitted 
by the remainder of title 8, chapter 6 of the Idaho code, including Idaho Code section 18-615. 
Id. § 18-615; see McCormack v. Hiedeman, 694 F.3d 1004, 1025 (9th Cir. 2012) (sustaining 
preliminary injunction against enforcement of Code Section 18-606). The abortion services 
that McCormack had sought, for reduction of cost, were medications prescribed over the 
internet. Id. at 1008. 
 129 HEALTH INSURANCE PORTABILITY AND ACCOUNTABILITY ACT OF 1996, Pub. 
L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 and 42 
U.S.C. (2012)).  
 130 See supra note 128. 
 131 See MILLER, supra note 115, at 56.  
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problematic presence in law, insofar as law is meant to be rational 
and consistent in its claims to jurisdiction and authority and, by 
the element of rationality and consistency of law, capable of 
bearing a moral weight proportionate to the coercion the law 
brings to bear on human conduct. Thus, the places made critical 
for the female body shift over time. The home has been capable of 
conferring anonymity and autonomy over reproduction (though 
often analyzed as a place of female imprisonment, domination, 
and domestication).132 The interior of the female body has allowed 
concealment from a demarcation of a private space. 
In response to the availability of legal abortion outside 
the privacy of the home through female collective efforts to gain 
access to low-cost medical services, private/public space in 
hospitals and clinics responsive to pregnant women’s needs 
have become the next place subject to attempts at control over 
female autonomy and privacy. Onerous regulations on the 
dimensions of hallways and the availability of expensive equipment 
relocate abortion services to full service hospitals, many of which do 
not in fact generally offer abortion. Laws regulating abortion clinics 
out of existence through micro-management of place are now being 
enhanced to limit entry by doctors into places left intact for service 
to women’s reproductive health. New legislation in Texas is 
expected to reduce the number of clinics offering abortion from a 
few dozen to approximately five.133 
Control over place is being further asserted by laws 
forbidding the ingestion of an abortion pill outside the presence 
of a physician.134 The conventional rhetoric criticizes such a law 
as interfering with the relationship between a woman and her 
physician, but of more significance is the effort to erase places in 
which women can claim autonomy once available to them through 
 
 132 The home is heavily associated with marital privacy, which has been critiqued 
as a danger to women. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Violence of Privacy, 23 CONN. L. REV. 
973, 975 (1991) (asserting that, “The notion of marital privacy has been a source of 
oppression to battered women and has helped to maintain women’s subordination within 
the family”); see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 888-94 (1992) 
(enumerating statistics on the prevalence of domestic violence and the danger to a pregnant 
woman of notifying her husband of her intent to have an abortion). 
 133 Anna M. Tinsley, Restrictive Law Could Force Most Texas Abortion Clinics 
to Close, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM (July 6, 2013), http://www.star-telegram.com/
2013/07/06/4985451/restrictive-law-could-force-most.html. 
 134 Tara Culp-Ressler, Five States Working to Limit Women’s Access to the 
Abortion Pill, THINKPROGRESS (May 14, 2013, 10:50 AM), http://thinkprogress.org/health/
2013/05/14/2007751/five-states-restrictions-abortion-pill/. A Louisiana law, enacted in June 
2013, provides that doctors qualified in obstetrics or gynecology must be in the same room 
and in the physical presence of the pregnant woman when the drug or chemical inducing an 
abortion is initially administered. A doctor who violates the new rule could be fined 
$1,000, imprisoned for two years, or both”). La. Rev. Stat. Ann § 40:1299.35.2.1 (2013).  
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the politely legal practice of abortion by physicians in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century and the long tradition of 
self-help in the home by women consulting one another.135 Thus, 
recent trends in the legal assertion of jurisdiction over and the 
legal mapping of both the female interior and permissible 
locations of the female body for the receipt of reproductive 
services expand the place within the body subject to regulation—
sonograms and monitoring—and reduce the space available to 
female embodiment for receipt of services. 
The disappearance of place as a physical presence that 
enables regulation is being countermanded by a legal attempt to 
restore and expand place as a factor in control over the female 
body. Such a trend is seemingly counter to other trends that the 
malleability of place empowers, allowing for a reduction of 
regulation that relies on literal place. Efforts in law to restore 
place as a decisive factor for the fate of women who have 
reproductive capacity betray an anxiety associated with the 
fluidity of place and the consequent autonomy that the waning 
hold of place over some human hazards produces. Indeed, with the 
movement toward enforced sonograms, the reconceptualization of a 
hidden place as public confronts and refutes the mapping logic used 
by Justice Kennedy to distinguish protected medical procedures 
from procedures that can be criminally punished.136 If Justice 
Kennedy is a geographer of the female body, legislators are the 
master map makers whose cartography of the female persona 
would, if allowed to stand, render his mapping as obsolete as any 
fading atlas forgotten on a bottom shelf in a neglected room of 
dusty volumes. 
3. Mapping More Than Inches 
For jurisdiction based on territorial logic, moral inches 
expand to feet, yards, and “rods” in certain criminal buffer 
statutes that permit forum shopping by prosecutors.137 In this 
example, place is allowed to be fluid, with prosecutors allowed 
to treat space as trivial for qualifying a locale in which to 
 
 135 REAGAN, supra note 123, at 28 (describing mothers’ determination to help 
daughters, with occasional collusion to hide an abortion from the father). 
 136 See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text. 
 137 Brian C. Kalt, Crossing Eight Mile: Juries of the Vicinage and County-Line 
Criminal Buffer Statutes, 80 WASH. L. REV. 271, 279 (2005) (“The width of the buffer 
zones established by these statutes ranges from 100 feet (in Louisiana) to a mile (in 
Arizona, Michigan, and Oregon); the median and most common distance is 1500 feet. 
Befitting the anachronistic nature of the statutes, some define the buffer width in rods, 
an archaic measure equal to 5 1/2 yards.”). 
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prosecute a defendant. A boundary loses its magic as a source 
of sensory input; an act that could not be visible to any person 
in the prosecuting jurisdiction138 is nonetheless sufficiently 
relevant to the sensibilities of the “vicinage”139 that will assess 
legal blame to allow its juries to impose legal liability for an act 
well outside its point of entry and in the interior of another legal 
space. Brian Kalt argues that the difference matters because the 
juries in counties next to a county where a crime occurred may well 
have different local sensibilities.140 Different counties receive 
different sensory input, in part from their demographic 
composition, so that the “minds” of the neighboring geographic 
areas may not be the same. Kalt argues that the difference in the 
“minds” is of sufficient moral weight to support legal protections for 
anyone accused of a crime in a buffer zone outside a neighboring 
county in which the state criminal buffer zone permits prosecution. 
Might a theory of place as a legal factor reduce the need for cosmic 
gambles created by line-drawing for which little rationale, except a 
shrug of the shoulder, can be offered? 
At the same time, a matter of 227 feet141 can bear the 
moral weight to determine whether a crime can be punished by 
death. The jurisdiction of the federal government over crimes 
in national forests is general and includes murder.142 In a case 
involving a murder in which the victim’s body was found in a lake 
in a national forest in Michigan, the court ruled, at the request of 
the parties, on subject matter jurisdiction issues, including issues 
of whether the United States had accepted jurisdiction over the 
forest when it accepted its transfer from Michigan and whether 
murder in national forests has been made criminal by the federal 
code.143 The defendant additionally argued basic constitutional 
infirmities in the “patchwork” or “checkerboard” nature of the 
existence of federal criminal jurisdiction in the Manistee National 
Forest, including due process (notice), equal protection (arbitrary 
 
 138 Brian Kalt notes that jurisdiction and venue are sometimes used 
interchangeably in cases or statutes, so here there is no fine distinction. Id. at 276. 
 139 Id. at 276. 
 140 Id. at 321. 
 141 United States v. Gabrion, 648 F.3d 307, 316-17 (6th Cir. 2011) (“His 
counsel wanted to offer in mitigation and argue to the jury that in our legal system 
Gabrion’s trial would have had to take place in state court where life imprisonment 
was the maximum punishment, instead of in the federal court, if the victim’s body had 
been found outside the Manistee National Forest, just 227 feet away from where it was 
found inside the National Forest. His counsel wanted the jury to choose life 
imprisonment, rather than the death penalty, because the State of Michigan had 
abolished the death penalty and had not executed anyone for more than 160 years.”). 
 142 United States v. Gabrion, 517 F.3d 839, 845 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 143 See id. at 839-44 . 
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and irrational scheme of geographical categorization of 
jurisdiction), and the Eighth Amendment (concerns in Furman v. 
Georgia about arbitrary enforcement of the death penalty).144 For 
equal protection, the Supreme Court had already reversed a 
Ninth Circuit holding that “geographic and thematic” 
checkerboard jurisdiction in Indian country “lacked a rational basis 
and violated the Equal Protection Clause.”145 The Sixth Circuit 
quotes the Supreme Court’s conclusion that the lines the Ninth 
Circuit thought irrational are standard for the place called Indian 
Country: “The lines the State has drawn may well be difficult to 
administer. But they are no more or less so than many of the 
classifications that pervade the law of Indian jurisdiction.”146 
In a concurrence, Sixth Circuit Judge Moore addressed 
the due process arguments in an earnest effort to rationalize 
the moral weight of minute mapping of territorial jurisdiction: 
[T]he fact that the federal government has criminal jurisdiction over 
some but not all of the parcels in the Manistee National Forest and 
that these are arrayed in a patchwork fashion does not mean 
Gabrion had no notice that death might be the potential penalty for 
first-degree murder within Manistee. Even if the federal government 
had criminal jurisdiction over the entirety of the Manistee National 
Forest, at some seemingly arbitrary geographic point a person would 
cross over from the area of Michigan’s criminal jurisdiction to the 
area of concurrent federal jurisdiction. If that person committed 
first-degree murder on one side of the line, he could not receive the 
death penalty; if the same person committed first-degree murder on 
the other side of the line, he might receive the death penalty. The 
jurisdictional consequences of committing first-degree murder within 
or outside of the Oxford Lake parcel is in no significant respect more 
arbitrary than the jurisdictional consequences of the same act were 
there no patchwork jurisdiction within the Manistee National 
Forest. In conclusion, I do not think the patchwork jurisdiction in the 
Manistee National Forest violates Gabrion’s right to due process or 
equal protection under the Fifth Amendment.147 
For due process and the vagaries of geography, Judge 
Moore echoed the Supreme Court’s so it goes view about the 
patchwork woven into territorial logic, with the fillip of a tie to 
place-derived forms of ethnic identity.148 Indeed, to buttress her 
argument that one arbitrary effect of geography is not worse than 
 
 144 Id. at 867 (Moore, J., concurring). 
 145 Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 
U.S. 463 (1979); Confederated Bands & Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 
552 F.2d 1332, 1335 (9th Cir. 1977). 
 146 Gabrion, 517 F.3d at 868 (Moore, J. concurring) (citing Confederated Bands 
& Tribes of Yakima Indian Nation, 439 U.S. at 502).  
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 866-69. 
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another, Judge Moore took refuge in a rule that Professor Peter 
Smith has classified as “a new legal fiction,” meaning any 
instance “when (1) the court offers an ostensibly factual 
supposition as a ground for creating a legal rule or modifying, or 
refusing to modify, an existing legal rule; and (2) the factual 
supposition is descriptively inaccurate.”149 Specifically, Judge 
Moore cited authority on ignorance of the law: “The general rule 
that ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to 
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in the American legal 
system.”150 As Smith notes, the saying, “ignorance of the law is no 
excuse,” is the extent of the law that most people know.151 Thus, 
the mysteries of small differences in the geographical moment of 
a concealed act of brutality, made to determine large 
differences in the penalty for a near madman,152 are brought to 
rest upon a legal fiction with little application to the average 
man and surely none to a brutish killer with a post-crime 
interest in the boundaries of a national forest. 
The need for a legal fiction to establish the moral 
defensibility of patchwork jurisdiction is no surprise. Justice 
Brennan wrote of “painful conversations,” when a lawyer must 
tell a client that the race of his victim in Georgia provides a 
strong indication of the probability of his receiving the death 
penalty upon conviction.153 Perhaps a killer’s learning that his 
exposure to capital punishment depends upon the morally 
insignificant happenstance of an uncertain few feet one way or 
the other in a national forest is less painful. It is bad luck of a 
cosmic size to have been on the wrong side of an arbitrary 
jurisdictional line in a poorly mapped and empty forest, but the 
lawyer can tell the client that line-drawing is always necessary in 
law. Here, the doctrine of place confesses the limits of moral 
reasoning in law, confronts and accepts the arbitrary nature of 
some lines, and asks those to whom the line points to death to 
appreciate the inevitable roll of the jurisdictional dice. 
 
 149 Peter J. Smith, New Legal Fictions, 95 GEO. L.J. 1435, 1441 (2010). 
 150 Gabrion, 517 F.3d. at 869 (Moore, J., concurring) (citing Cheek v. United 
States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991)). 
 151 Smith, supra note 149, at 1459 (citing GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL LAW 405 (1978)); see also Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct 
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 645-46 (1984) 
(“If one were to take a poll and ask about the legal significance of ignorance of law, 
most nonlawyers would answer, I believe, by citing the maxim that ‘ignorance of the 
law is no excuse.’”). 
 152 Gabrion, 517 F.3d at 869. 
 153 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 345 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Moral inches may seem like the framework of a mystic or 
medieval theologian, or of a strangely high-minded pettifogger, or 
the ending point for the capacity of logic to supply fit distinctions. 
But Justice Kennedy was not really reasoning about the moral 
significance of place on a general level, and neither are the 
justices and judges who agree that one instance of using small 
measures of space for large legal effects is no more 
unconstitutional than another. Extending his relaxed approach to 
place as a metric of birth and criminal penalty, Justice Kennedy 
also relied upon place, i.e., the location of a fetus in a female body, 
to create an identity—that of mother—and even to ascribe to the 
woman, imagined as containing a mystical “place,” with 
generative powers, the act of creating life.154 
Perhaps it is for the Restatement of Place to find the inner 
logic of laws that measure law’s domain and attendant personal 
accountability and standards of conduct by rulers, or yardsticks, 
or the surveyors’ instruments for mapping rough terrain. 
B. Nonplace 
Some parts of the world, which is to say some places, 
are not places. They do nothing that place ordinarily does. They 
do not confer or intensify identity as might a gay bar in the 
1990s or a private club in the 1880s; they empty the occupant 
of identity, plunging the person into a zone of distance from 
any but a core self in an anonymous world.155 By contrast, some 
geographic sorting creates enclaves of intensified identity.156 
“Nonplaces” are deserts of human connection, despite the 
presence of human beings. A nonplace makes strangers among 
strangers. Unlike a place, in which a stranger may begin to 
assert personal meanings through encounters amenable to 
reconstructing identity through personal exchange, query and 
 
 154 Cf. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 151-55 (2007). 
 155 For an extreme contrast, a person can have an identity attach in one discursive 
space and then be imposed on her in another discursive space. I have suggested gay bars as 
an example. Once a person enters a bar of the sort that, at least until recently, was a 
gathering spot for gay people to reveal by their presence in the bar their possible availability 
for gay social life, an identity attached over which the person lacked control in a different 
discursive environment. Marc Poirer explores the attempt by the Boy Scout, James Dale, to 
separate the discursive environments of his college campus, where he was openly gay and 
activist, and his local Boy Scout troop, in which he sought to retain, unaffected by his 
presence in another discursive space, an unmodified identity as a Boy Scout. Poirier 
analyzes the means by which the law read his presence in one discursive location as 
attaching permanently to his body. See Poirier, Discursive Space, supra note 19, at 315. The 
term I offer for this phenomenon is identity-forming/intensifying place.  
 156 See Yishai Blank & Issi Rosen-Zvi, The Geography of Sexuality, 90 N.C. L. 
REV. 955 (2012). 
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displays of need, the nonplace offers no hope of socially 
constructed comprehensibility supplied by residents with 
memories and “ownership.” The following description captures 
the texture of a nonplace: 
[A] “nonplace” [is] “a space which cannot be defined as relational, or 
historical, or concerned with identity”; defined by what it lacks, a nonplace 
effects a certain detachment between it and the people traversing it. 
Nonplaces, such as freeways, airports, supermarkets, and even ATMs—
all planned, sterile, and transient—are not conducive to the expression of 
collective contractual obligations based on shared values and beliefs, [sic] 
such obligations would be better expressed for example in nonplanned 
neighborhoods with a history. Haifa’s Central Bus Station lacked any 
such historical contexts; the six-lane highway, the concrete buildings, and 
the harsh, angular shape of the station itself were alienating (not to 
mention plain ugly). The area was designed to be passed through, not to 
encourage people to linger around nor to convey (or to be receptive to) 
messages based on “collective contractual obligations.”157 
Law’s function in a nonplace is minimal. Laws against 
crime are in effect, though many nonplaces may be less defensible 
than places. Random crimes with no motive and no witness were 
once very difficult to detect. Today, ubiquitous video cameras158 
can capture the moment of a crime and provide leads to 
apprehend criminals who take advantage of a nonplace to inflict 
harm or exploit others. But nonplaces are not defined by any law 
that mandates such precautions. The territory for a nonplace to 
exist is limitless, and only dense, commonly used nonplaces are 
likely to have video monitoring. Roadside memorials occupy small 
nonplaces that are created by the serendipity of tragedy that 
brings survivors to mark the nonplace as place with memory. But 
 
 157 Sharon Halevi & Orna Blumen, What a Difference a Place Makes: The 
Reflexive (Mis)management of a City’s Pasts, 37 J. URB. HIST. 384, 389 (2011). 
 158 See Adam Schwartz, Chicago’s Video Surveillance Cameras: A Pervasive 
and Poorly Regulated Threat to Our Privacy, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 47, 47 
(2013). Schwartz notes with, some concern for privacy, civil liberties, and a paucity of 
regulation, that “[t]hese cameras have powers that greatly exceed ordinary powers of 
human observation, including automatic tracking of cars, and magnification of small 
objects at great distances.” Id. at 48. Schwartz further describes Chicago’s system of 
video surveillance: “Chicago’s system of video surveillance cameras has three critical 
features: their vast numbers, their tight integration, and their powerful abilities to 
gather and analyze information. Together, these features empower City government to 
monitor anyone automatically, quickly, easily, inexpensively, and surreptitiously, in all 
public places and at all times.” Id. The attempt to provide the capacities of human 
presence to places where direct observation may not occur has the effect of altering the 
limitations of human perception and transforming the texture of situated life, with its 
omissions of observation on which place-bound humanity has long relied for the 
unimportance of some ephemeral moments. The loss of ephemera, meaning the 
preservation of moments otherwise fleeting in human memory and lost to history, as a 
feature of living implicates legal rules, which must seek a means of discounting the 
observed, which once would have lacked the staying power to raise a legal concern. 
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the memory is private and not capable of marking the character 
of the isolated nonplace anything more than “planned, sterile, 
and transient.” 
There are tentative attempts at creating laws to 
regulate nonplaces, such as regulation of roadside crosses, but 
no conceptual glue to bring together a legal theory of the 
nonplace. There are virtually no regulations covering the use of 
surveillance cameras to monitor public places.159 The widespread 
acceptance of videotaping of commercial establishments is 
reflected in television entertainment consisting of taped incidents 
in retail establishments.160 Viewers can observe behavior 
undertaken as though the place exclusively defines the 
interaction as one of unilateral power with no traces in place 
memory; part of the fascination is in seeing what was once 
unseen—visceral power exercised in a place that permits 
opportunistic violation of social distance and legal order. The 
camera permits a view of the remaining power of place as 
determinative through the brute “reality” of human fate and 
attempts to rebut the power by a clinical observation of the 
wrongdoer. The camera simultaneously enforces the domain of 
law and documents the domain of unseen, hidden place as 
transient power in an unprotected location. 
A possible function for legal mandates could be a theory 
of the public’s obligation to give the nonplace a degree of 
“placeness,” supplemented by standards requiring, for example, 
video monitoring, or imposing rules on private owners to avoid 
 
 159 The critical concept for all monitoring with a “beeper” that reveals evidence 
that could have been discernible visually to the naked eye is the existence, or not, of 
“an expectation of privacy.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 280-83 (1983). 
“Nothing in the Fourth Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory 
faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and 
technology afforded them in this case.” Id. at 282; see also United States v. Karo, 468 
U.S. 705, 713-16 (1984) (distinguishing the expectation of privacy from a beeper in an 
object carried through the streets and various private locations from the expectation of 
privacy in an individual’s home). On public streets, no such expectation exists. Thus, 
video monitoring of a street by commercial entities is as unregulated as is video 
monitoring by police agencies. For the interior of businesses, there is legal advice to 
owners to post notices that the site is subject to video monitoring, thereby deflecting by 
the theory of consent any objection by customers about violation of privacy. How to Legally 
Use Security Cameras to Avoid Breaking Privacy Laws, EHOW, http://www.ehow.com/how_
2040855_legally-use-security-cameras-avoid.html (last visited June 19, 2013). The 
permission to enhance what can be detected with human senses, were the human positioned 
to use his senses, seemingly opens most activity outside the home to detection and 
recordation by powerful video equipment. The expansion of the reach of the senses in part 
redefines place, which has a deep association with the reach of the human senses. In 
contrast, it also helps to regulate unplaces, affording some possibility of enhanced 
security, or punishment of wrongdoers when deterrence fails. 
 160 Caught on Camera (MSNBC television broadcast 2008–2013) presents 
miscellaneous videos that show store robberies and, occasionally, home invasions. 
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the menacing features of a nonplace. Laws requiring the 
cleanup of blighted properties are an example. 
C. Imaginary Place As Stand-in for Power 
Indeed, the lack of a representative record of events in a 
place is increasingly seen as an erasure of place, a masking of a 
shareable imprint of meaning in a place by an anarchic 
moment that requires admission into the city gate of collective 
perception, else depriving the physical world of the feature of 
place in which we live: representations that give place textual 
weight to study and re-experience. The Boston bombing 
established itself as a comprehensible event in a place—once the 
video cameras delivered the visual record of action in a place to 
our collective perception and allowed a cartography of mass 
murder to form through our shared glimpse of a moment in a 
physically recognizable Boston location.161 The drive to see the 
video of the crime was not merely to find the culprits, but to read 
the text of the place and time and help make it a collective 
cultural moment—in a place. The video does not just help nab 
the bombers; it creates a place memory with a narrative. For 
the place to be as real as place can be, its recreation with 
avatars would be ideal. Chance recordings that lack staging by 
a director and thus editing for continuity are not a satisfying 
depiction of an iconic moment in a place. Reconstructed reality 
can provide the “realism” that small glimpses in a camera 
aimed incidentally at the event do not convey.162 
In the aftermath of the San Francisco plane crash, captured 
by chance on video, there have been puzzled questions about the 
absence of cameras to capture all aircraft landings.163 The 
 
 161 See NICHOLAS OF CUSA, supra note 74. 
 162 Courtrooms are increasingly assisted by technology to simulate events 
visually to persuade juries more effectively of a favored narrative of an event. See, e.g., 
Jeff Aresty, Daniel Rainey & James Cormie, State Courts and the Transformation to 
Virtual Courts, 39 LITIG. 50, 52 (2013) (“With the ubiquity of high-resolution flat-
screen televisions, litigators employ dramatic reconstruction of accidents and distill 
complex issues with simple video explanations. Today’s lawyer does not need words to 
explain his or her theory of the accident. Instead, the lawyer can present a dramatic 
video interpretation with computer generated actors and digitally recreated scenes. 
Add to this the advancements in multimedia programs and the litigator’s ability to 
convince a jury increases dramatically.”). 
 163 See Daro Felch, Comment to 2 Killed, Many Injured as Plane Crash Lands 
at San Francisco Airport, BUZZFEED (July 6, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/
adriancarrasquillo/fire-rages-as-plane-crash-lands-at-san-francisco-airport (“How come 
there are no cameras where planes take-off and land[?]”); Eric Lee Shively, Comment 
to Horrifying Raw Video: Asiana Flight 214 Crash Landing Caught on Film, BLAZE 
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realization dawns that airport landing strips are deserts for 
perception yet locations of fraught moments that call for place to be 
created and preserved—by cameras. Once the landing of an 
airplane was seen as an incongruity in its apparitional appearance 
in a remote place; now the failure to assure the “placeness” of the 
moment of landing, that is, to make it meaningful and not merely 
transient, is remarked upon as a strange failure of human 
connection. Legal obligations to record certain unobserved 
moments of critical importance address the demand to infuse 
nonplaces with the possibilities of human memory—and enhanced 
legal accountability and risk management. 
VI. SELECTED PLACE-RELATED LEGAL SUBJECTS: A PARTIAL 
COMPILATION164 
A partial review of treatise-style compilations of doctrine 
on manifestly place-infused topics provides a beginning listing of 
the types of standard Restatement treatments that could be 
reorganized to catalogue a ground level review of place in the law 
of proximity, location, space, and boundary. From the most 
abstract foundations using place to organize a structure of law 
(e.g., sovereignty, citizenship, territorial dominion), to a referent 
to something tangible yet linked to an existing domain (e.g., 
rights of coastal areas to the adjacent sea), to a concrete referent 
for a simple legal obligation (e.g., the definition of “garage” in an 
insurance contract), one can begin to frame the range of concerns 
that share the commonality of reasoning about place, territory, 
proximity, geography, and so on.165 Within the scope of this article, 
                                                                                                                                     
(July 7, 2013, 2:29 PM) (“Whats [sic] sad [is] that there are no cameras at our 
airports . . . TSA has no cameras or videos at our airports . . . Sad[.]”). 
 164 A more thorough yet still non-comprehensive list also includes: Food & 
Agriculture Law; Criminal Law and Defense of Home; Place and Moral Significance; 
Overlapping Places; Nonplace Regulation; Place-Literal Jurisdiction, Arbitrary Place 
Consequences; Place-Literal Rules: Marriage; Place-Modified Citizenship; Conquest-
Modified Place; Metaphorical Place-Defined Enclosures; Place-Enforced Disassociation; 
Law-Stipulated Place Lines; Identity-Forming/Intensifying Place; Sacred Place; Lost Place; 
and Ruin Porn. This list is a product of the author’s lengthy deliberations on the subject. 
 165 Allan Ebersen provides a starting point for analyzing spatial concepts in 
the Constitution by examining textual references to spaces that create a formal 
typology of space, while noting the overlaps that arise between multiple constitutional 
spaces and a given physical space. See Allan Ebersen, Constitutional Spaces, 95 MINN. 
L. REV. 1168, 1168-69 (2011) (indicating that his “analysis shows that many discrete 
problems on which scholars have focused—such as the rights of U.S. military detainees 
abroad and the extraterritorial reach of state law—are manifestations of a broader 
phenomenon that exists because of indeterminacy in the Constitution’s typology of 
spaces”). In Ebersen’s words, “The Article . . . provides a foundation for future 
scholarship addressing a wide range of constitutional questions linked to the 
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it is not possible to create a comprehensive list, but a beginning 
selection can suggest the richness of place as a presence 
throughout legal materials, at every possible level of abstraction or 
specific use. Besides grasping the range implicated in legal 
materials by place ideas and topics, one can begin to identify and 
analyze consistency and inconsistency in the logical constructs for 
handling identity, obligations and rights, and the scope of the “law 
of place” by examining how location as a concrete measurement or 
a conceptual frame constructs doctrine. 
A. Maps and Cartography as a Source of Legal Issues 
The enterprise that deals with place as its primary 
concern is cartography, or map-making. Because place is the basic 
feature that orients people to the world as a physical fact, and a 
form by which the configuration of nations, counties, and towns 
are imposed and sovereignty announced, maps are a natural 
source of conflict. Mistakes in maps, or simple disagreement 
about the traditional lines to be captured in a map, can generate 
long-term sovereign conflict, or neighborhood disputes.166 They 
can also generate tort litigation if the misplacement of a tower on 
an aviation map causes an aviation accident.167 
Map-making is a close partner to physical 
reconfiguration of communities, re-engineering of ecology, and 
imposing the layout that defines a region. Mapping is the 
means by which transportation is laid out to make the far near, 
and the near far.168 
B. The Workplace Landscape 
Puzzles affecting the logic of law arise and call for refreshed 
compilation, as with the regulation of the workplace: what rules of 
employer responsibility apply to the workplace when it is 
                                                                                                                                     
boundaries and status of discrete spaces.” Id. at 1169. Thus, Ebersen has provided one 
template for the development of a set of “boundary” principles by an ALI project. 
 166 John D. Sutter, Google Maps Border Becomes Part of International Dispute, 
CNN (Nov. 5, 2010) (concerning possible mistake in Google map and subsequent 
dispute between Nicaragua and Cost Rica), http://www.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/11/
05/nicaragua.raid.google.maps/. 
 167 Reminga v. United States, 631 F.2d 449, 450-51 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 168 WHITE, supra note 98, at xxix (2011) (referring to making “the far near” but 
also to “render[ing] . . . space radically unstable and seemingly subject to the whims of 
distant corporations”); see also id. at 140-78 (describing in comprehensive detail the 
development of “the politics of space” as a result of the ability of the railroads to impose 
maps and create pricing that altered practical distances for towns); JOHNSON, supra 
note 4, at 11 (“Rather than inhabiting space, merchant capital made it, fabricating 
connections and annihilating distances according to rates of interest and freight . . . .”). 
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transferred by technology to the home?169 What of injuries to 
workers that arise from the physical re-creation of a work 
environment away from direct employer control? Does the 
convenience of work from home privatize the risks of employment? 
Does it effectively transfer the costs of work risk and office design 
to the worker? Might it become part of a trend to relieve employers 
of obligations to workers?170 If so, could work in the home provide 
not only flexibility, but a return to greater autonomy for workers of 
the kind that was reduced and even eliminated by the movement of 
work into industrial and office settings and away from farms and 
cottage industries? Is regulation of the home-work environment a 
good form of protective law that disciplines bargaining, or is 
bargaining, and common law apportionment of risk, acceptable 
outside the context of nineteenth century mechanization and large-
scale on-site work? 
The grand project for thinking about these issues of 
rationalizing doctrine in a new configuration of the place for 
work is not merely one of picking and choosing policy answers 
derived from regulatory schemes to protect workers in an 
industrial or cubicle setting. Rather, creating a new ontology of 
social space171 as it relates to law is the scope of the project; the 
worker—a physical being in a physical space that produces 
products and awards the right to its owners to structure and 
even to control his movements, monitor his time and 
productivity in directly observable units, control the manner of 
the “sheathing of his body,”172 and test his bodily emissions for 
 
 169 For this question, I am grateful for my conversations with a staff member 
of the A.L.I. 
 170 The Labor Department provides a review of questions and answers about 
legal issues for at-home work that considers issues of liability for workplace injuries, 
non-discrimination in assigning or not assigning employees to at-home work 
placement, requirements for paying wages, rules on reasonable accommodations for 
disability, limitations on imposing business costs on workers with the effect of reducing 
wages, and so forth. See Pandemic Flu and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Questions 
and Answers, WAGE & HOUR DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/whd/
healthcare/flu_FLSA.htm (last visited June 14, 2013). In addition, the ordinary rules of 
tort could apply if the at-home work site is not safe and the employer has failed to take 
measures to protect home workers. 
 171 Delaney, in analyzing assumptions about territoriality as the basis for 
legal jurisdiction and for the assumed “containment” of social phenomena within 
borders, draws attention to the work of Jan Art Scholte, who has argued that 
“globalization calls into question the prevailing territorialist ontology of social theory” 
and has described a need for “a new, non-territorial cartography of social life.” See 
DELANEY, supra note 20, at 68 (quoting J.A. Scholte, Beyond the Buzzword: Towards a 
Critical Theory of Globalization, in GLOBALIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 48-49 
(Eleanore Kofman & Gillian Young eds., 1996)). 
 172 Id. at 66-69 (citing ERVING GOFFMAN, RELATIONS IN PUBLIC: MICROSTUDIES OF 
THE PUBLIC ORDER 38 (1971)) (on the sheathing of the body by skin, and by a layer of 
clothing as a form of “egocentric territoriality”). 
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drugs—recovers and re-configures his control over personal 
movements and bodily boundaries in home settings for work. 
Additionally, consider the developments of workplace 
spaces for white-collar workers. The designers of workspaces 
for white collar work sought efficiency in the uses of space, and 
set up workplaces that lacked privacy. The legal system 
generally did not intervene to establish norms for white-collar 
workspaces. Yet studies have shown that the type of workspace 
that enables white collar workers to concentrate and be 
productive is one that mimics a well-designed home, with nooks 
for privacy, individual spaces for each family member’s avocations 
and interests, and a comforting feeling of enclosure.173 For white-
collar workers, the dimension of time has been regulated to 
protect their welfare, within limits,174 but space is not a legal 
subject.175 By contrast, occupational safety emerged as a concern 
in the United States as a result of the labor movement, 
responding to a history of disasters caused by the use of space to 
maximize profit with no regard for worker safety or simple 
human needs. Disasters now associated with the third world 
garment industry were once a factor in the United States.176 As 
 
 173 WITOLD RYBCYNSKI, HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF AN IDEA 226-32 (1986); 
see also Home Sweet Office: Comfort in the Workplace, HERMAN MILLER, 
http://www.hermanmiller.com/research/research-summaries/home-sweet-office-comfort-in-
the-workplace.html (last visited Nov. 22, 2013) (summarizing studies of the advantages 
of perceived comfort for worker satisfaction and productivity). 
 174 29 U.S.C. § 207 (2011). For compliance guidelines, see Compliance 
Assistance Materials, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, http://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-
flsa.htmhttp://www.dol.gov/compliance/laws/comp-flsa.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
 175 But see infra note 178. 
 176 Nineteenth century American diarist George Templeton Strong provided a 
vivid impression of the disastrous implications of an unregulated industrial workplace 
during the Industrial Revolution in the Northeast United States: 
News today of a fearful tragedy at Lawrence, Massachusetts, one of the 
wholesale murders commonly known in newspaper literature as accident or 
catastrophe. A huge factory, long notoriously insecure and ill-built, requiring 
to be patched and bandaged up with iron plates and braces to stand the 
introduction of its machinery, suddenly collapsed into a heap of ruins 
yesterday afternoon without the smallest provocation. Some five or six 
hundred operatives went down with it—young girls and women mostly. An 
hour or two later, while people were working frantically to dig out some two 
hundred still under the ruins, many of them alive and calling for help, some 
quite unhurt, fire caught the great pile of debris, and these prisoners were 
roasted. It is too atrocious and horrible to think of. 
Of course, nobody will be hanged. Somebody has murdered about two 
hundred people, many of them with hideous torture, in order to save money, 
but society has no avenging gibbet for the respectable millionaire and 
homicide. Of course not. He did not want to or mean to do this massacre; on 
the whole, he probably would have preferred to let these people live. His 
intent was not homicidal. He merely thought a great deal about making a 
large profit and very little about the security of human life. 
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a result, some overt regulation of place is an outgrowth of a 
workers’ rights movement. 
But for neither industrial workers nor white-collar 
workers is the insight gained from knowledge accumulated by 
architecture and design work for the middle class incorporated 
into legal rules for the workplace. The aspiration is minimal 
standards that avoid harm to health, but not for the design of 
places for work with sufficient attention to reproducing the 
comfort and benefits of a well-designed home.177 The concerns for 
workers primarily relate to basic physical needs: enough room to 
move around and store tools, sufficient lighting, prevention of 
loud noise and vibration, a reasonable temperature, protection 
from second-hand smoke, access to toilets and break rooms, and 
access to first aid.178 Some architects seek designs that inspire 
collaboration and solitary work, in a mixture of spaces conducive 
to spurts of intensity, relaxation, creativity, and focus,179 but the 
standard for the workplace does not seek to alleviate the problems 
identified in the twentieth-century literature emphasizing how 
the configuration of assembly lines and office cubicles alienates 
and damages workers. Law has not sought to regulate and shape 
space for work to protect the human spirit. The dystopian view of 
long halls with closed doors containing isolated office workers does 
not attract legal regulation of the nuances of space for work life or 
human satisfaction. The market, not law, addresses the part of 
human flourishing within space as a means of increasing the 
return on investment. 
Yet law has some role in “architectural regulation,”180 
the term devised by Larry Lessig to describe the capacity of law 
to regulate by reconfiguring standards for physical spaces and 
setting design specifications for processes and technologies 
that, unnoticed by the user, structure her interactions with 
other users and services. Architectural regulation has a mission 
opposite to the visibility described by the figure of the city gates 
and imputed to the “moral inches” of child birth. Sensory 
                                                                                                                                     
THE DIARY OF TEMPLETON STRONG: THE CIVIL WAR 1860–1865 4 (Allan Nevins & 
Milton Halsey Thomas eds., 1952). 
 177 RYBCZNSKI, supra note 173, at 228. 
 178 Loos, Noise, Heat, Light . . . Six Things You Need to Know About Workplace 
Rules, LAW DONUT, http://www.lawdonut.co.uk/law/health-and-safety/loos-noise-heat-
light-six-things-you-need-to-know-about-workplace-rules (last visited May 19, 2013). 
 179 Piers Fawkes, Your Next Office Will Look Like a Pop-Up Shop (Future of Work), 
PSFK.COM (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.psfk.com/2013/02/pop-up-office-future-of-work.html. 
 180 See Tien, supra note 55, at 1 (citing Joel Reidenberg, Lex Informatica: The 
Formulation of Information Policy Rules Through Technology, 76 TEX. L. REV. 553 
(1998)); see also LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE (1999). 
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impressions come randomly through the city gates to all, and are 
constructed for wide receipt by inclusion in a legal text verbally 
mapping the female body. By contrast, the unseen structure that 
channels daily activities allows for law to alter the spaces around 
which evolving habits and behaviors shaped by design choices are 
clustered. These “architecturally regulated” spaces are not 
understood by users of the structured setting to be a product of 
design. They seem a natural environment insofar as they attract 
notice. They channel behavior by altering apparent choices, hence 
reducing the need for regulation to control behavior. Design is 
decisive. The architecture metaphor recognizes that place as a 
social context is manipulated and presented as natural, both in 
the physical world and in the unseen world of technology.181 The 
alteration of place by forms of manipulation and by technology 
design, and by the mere existence and use of technological 
methods, has effects that cancel physical place as a brute fact 
but also overcome the sheltering features of physical place. 
Imagining a shift in the “cartography of social life” 
invites systematic reasoning about the worker’s relation to a 
space that shapes his identity, to his own bodily “territory and 
boundaries,” and to the autonomy of labor. The new technology 
permits distance health treatment, including psychotherapy that 
utilizes avatars in “immersive virtual reality.”182 Practicing 
therapy remotely raises numerous legal issues, including the 
geographic control over professional licensing, encryption to 
secure patient confidences, and numerous telehealth laws and 
regulations.183 Aligning legal doctrine in accordance with a 
 
 181 Tien, supra note 55, at 11 (“The metaphor of ‘architecture’ suggests that 
architectural regulation possesses a structural nature, i.e., it is built into or embedded in the 
practical conditions of everyday life. Two obvious candidates for architecting are the things 
we use – equipment – as well as social settings, most of which contain equipment. This 
metaphor also suggests the important role of architects: those actors or groups, or 
successions of actors, who designed or shaped equipment and social settings.”). 
 182 Tori DeAngelis, A Second Life for Practice?, 43 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N 
MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 48 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.apa.org/monitor/2012/
03/avatars.aspx. 
These virtual environments are computer-simulated interactive spaces that 
appear and feel to users like they’re inhabiting a relatively real setting. They 
are often populated by avatars that interact, talk, gesture, walk and 
“teleport”—travel to any location they choose. Virtual environments create a 
feeling of person-to-person presence and immersion—the sense of actually 
sharing a space with others. 
Id.  
 183 Tori DeAngelis, Practicing Distance Therapy, Legally and Ethically, 43 AM. 
PSYCHOL. ASS’N MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 52 (2012). For the level of legal contract 
protections for a free online 3D virtual world called Second Life, see the extended legal 
provisions posted as Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE, http://secondlife.com/corporate/
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coherent conception of the effects of newly fluid notions of the site 
for work demands new efforts at compilation and rationalization. 
If place for work is privatized, is law’s domain reduced?184 
If place is transcended, as with DNA tests that overcome the need 
for place-tied embodiment and hence reduce the limitations of place 
for capturing the physical proofs of crime, are the rules of search 
and seizure so altered as to undermine core understandings about 
the protections of the Fourth Amendment?185 Should place as brute 
fact be privileged as the natural order permitting concealment or 
should the tools of detection be accepted as a means of overcoming 
the power of place to inflict unaccountable harms? 
C. Place and the Dead: Parks, Crimes, and Remains of War 
and Terror 
The dead remain with us and also have a claim on place. 
The dead alter place even when they are forgotten by later 
residents in the same place. Most churches in English villages are 
said to sit below ground level.186 Simple math explains why. In a 
small English village of about 250 people, one might expect 1,000 
deaths in a century. Over a period of centuries, the number of 
bodies becomes as many as 20,000, a mass which causes the 
ground to rise.187 
State statutes contain regulations of cemeteries with 
norms and standards for the relationship of the remains of the 
dead to place. Though the centuries over which the dead occupy 
a place effaces all memory of their presence or who they are, 
the presently living seek to protect the connection of the dead 
to a place. One purpose of the regulations is to assure the 
continuing respectful treatment of the remains of the dead and 
their connection to a place, within a measured proximity.188 The 
                                                                                                                                     
tos.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2013) (addressing various topics that vary from time to 
time, such as Online Service, Content License and Intellectual Property Rights, 
Eligibility to Use the Service, Privacy and Your Personal Information, Dispute 
Resolution and Arbitration). 
 184 Marc Poirier comments: “Well, yes. Federal regulation of the workplace, as 
of the First Amendment—public/private matters tremendously.” E-mail from Marc 
Poirier, Professor of Law, Seton Hall University School of Law, to author (Aug. 30, 
2013, 7:30 PM EST) (on file with author) (paragraphing omitted).  
 185 See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958 (2013). 
 186 See BILL BRYSON, AT HOME: A SHORT HISTORY OF PRIVATE LIFE 4-5 (2011) 
 187 Id. at 5. 
 188 MICH. COMP. LAWS § 128.44 (2013) (“That when any cemetery shall be 
vacated as provided in this act, the said trustees or common council shall cause all the 
dead bodies and remains buried in such cemetery to be re-interred in the cemetery of 
such city or village, if they have one, and if not, then in some suitable cemetery not 
more than 6 miles from the nearest corporate limits of said city or village in a prudent, 
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insistence of proximity is for the dignity of the dead, but is 
entombed within an expectation of memory by the living—a 
memory connected to place, yet presumed to matter for the 
living wherever relocated and outside of the limits of time and 
memory. When the dead experience motion in transport, the 
hearse carrying them slows and other drivers do as well. When 
they travel alone, as in an urn, someone must sign a receipt 
acknowledging their welcome to a place with an address.189 
Traumatic deaths in a previously ordinary place trigger 
powerful emotions about the liminal sacredness of places 
defined by the instant of death. If remains cannot be reliably 
removed to the custody of survivors, the place remains the 
emotional center of grief and contestation over its return to 
secular uses.190 Emotions about the significance of the place of 
the moment of dying have gravitated to a practice of 
“communally and anonymously created” spontaneous shrines 
in proximity to the place of unexpected death.191 Roadside 
crosses are a manifestation of private focus on the place of a 
loved one’s death, although they are rarely a point for 
                                                                                                                                     
careful and respectful manner, and shall cause to be removed and again erected over 
the proper remains, all permanent fences around graves and lots, all tombstones and 
monuments, with as little injury as the case will admit, Provided, That no removal of 
said bodies and remains shall be made during the months of June, July, August or 
September, such removal, and the costs of the proceedings under this act, shall be at 
the expense of and paid by the city or village in which such cemetery is located.”). 
 189 DMM Revision: Mailing of Cremated Remains, U.S. POSTAL SERVICE (Aug. 23, 
2012), http://about.usps.com/postal-bulletin/2012/pb22344/html/updt_002.htm (“Human 
ashes (cremated remains) are permitted to be mailed provided they are in a strong and 
durable container and packaged as required in 9.2. The identity of the contents should be 
marked on the address side. Mailpieces sent to domestic addresses must be sent via Express 
Mail® or Registered Mail® service.”). Concern for place and human remains extends to 
hesitation to permit human burials in pet cemeteries, and produces warnings and 
regulations if the desire for interment in a pet burial ground is allowed. Kristen Seymour, 
With Fido Forever: Owners Who Want to Be Buried in Pet Cemeteries, TODAY (Jan. 27, 2012, 
11:22 AM), http://www.today.com/id/46044474/ns/today-today_pets/t/fido-forever-owners-
who-want-be-buried-pet-cemeteries/#.UdsKQ7HD_rc (“New York pet cemeteries may not 
advertise or charge for the burial of cremated human remains, and humans wishing to be 
interred in a pet cemetery must receive written notice that their remains will not be covered 
by the protections and legal rights granted to human cemeteries.”). 
 190 Frazier Moore, ‘Sacred Ground’ Charts a Stormy Planning Process to 
Rebuild at Ground Zero, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION (Sept. 1, 2004), http://jacksonville.com/
apnews/stories/090104/D84QE56G2.shtml; see KENNETH E. FOOTE, SHADOWED 
GROUND: AMERICAN’S LANDSCAPE OF VIOLENCE AND TRAGEDY 335-45 (rev. ed. 2003). 
Foote identifies a trend, in light of rapid development of a memorial to the victims of 
the Oklahoma bombing and plans for a 9/11 living memorial, to acknowledge the 
connection of places to trauma. “Explicit in the planning [for the Oklahoma site] were 
efforts to anchor memory in a specific site, interpret the meaning in nearby exhibitions, 
preserve evidence of the trauma in archival collections, and disseminate knowledge of 
the event . . . .” Id. at 341.  
 191 See Sylvia Grider, Spontaneous Shrines and Public Memorialization, in DEATH 
AND RELIGION IN A CHANGING WORLD 246, 248 (Katherine Garces-Foley ed., 2006). 
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strangers to pause or gather.192 Roadside crosses attract 
controversy, with strong criticisms, fervent defense, and legal 
regulation.193 Some jurisdictions ban them, some enact legal 
protection, and some create standardization.194 Because those 
who place the crosses ignore the law’s efforts to ban or limit 
them on state property, the crosses return if removed and 
thereby “creat[e] a dialog between the vernacular process and 
official attempts at control.”195 
Claiming space as sacred and communally available 
outside the purview of legal entitlements is a microcosm of the 
mysteries of place as core to defining meanings in the world, 
elusive to logical exegesis, and persistently present in the 
claimed domain of law. It should be possible to frame principles to 
guide law in responding to the ways in which ordinary space, or 
even a nonplace, assumes a sacred/secular meaning to which 
dignitary interests attach. The permanent withdrawal of spaces 
from ordinary regulation is unrealistic, so principles could be 
fashioned to address the temporal claim on markings and 
preservation while disciplining the reach of such claims. As the 
purely physical conception of the world recedes, and the physical 
and the imaginary mingle in new ways, law confronts a need to 
formulate doctrines that respond to evolving human 
perceptions of place’s significance. 
D. Place as Touchstone for Secular/Sacred Function: 
Folktales of Place and Justice 
On a meta level and a micro level, place grounds a claim 
to exclusive control over certain functions. Because nations are 
always defined with respect to landmass, only a sovereign with 
authority over a landmass can make the claims associated with 
sovereignty. Among these is the critical monopoly on justice 
explained by Robert Cover in Folktales of Justice.196 Cover 
quotes President Charles DeGaulle, in refusing permission to 
Sartre to hold a tribunal on French soil for judging American 
 
 192 Id. at 259 (noting that “[f]ew passers-by . . . ever stop and look carefully”). 
Indeed, these roadside shrines create a moment of reflection for the motorist on 
physical proximity, anonymity, and the capacity of the sacred to sustain its meaning 
where personal movement, or “automobility,” is the dominant motif. 
 193 For a debate about their contested nature, see Room for Debate, Should 
Roadside Memorials Be Banned, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2009, 7:00 PM), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/12/should-roadside-memorials-be-banned/.  
 194 Grider, supra note 191, at 259. 
 195 Id. at 260. 
 196 Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. 
L. REV. 179 (1985). 
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war crimes in Vietnam, instructing the philosopher about the 
state monopoly over the dispensing of law: “I have no need to 
tell you that justice of any sort, in principle as in execution, 
emanates from the State.”197 
For Sartre, justice transcends place; most injustice occurs 
in the physical world, where harm can be made destructive of life, 
limb, and shelter. But imposing justice need not be confined to the 
claims of place; knowledge is outside of place. The possibilities for 
assembling evidence, advocates, and judges are factually beyond 
the limitations of place; today, since Sartre, the means of 
constituting a capacity for judgment, condemnation, and rebuke, 
with moral effects, is relatively unconfined by the claims of 
physical place, though the sovereign tied to State control over 
place does not lack means to respond.  
The salient example of the ability to overcome state 
control over territory is the success of Wikileaks in exposing 
government secrets that subject governments to public 
accountability for activities leaders wish to conceal.198 The quest 
for justice for events located in time and place that Sartre 
attempted to pursue, necessarily in a physical place, now occurs 
in the reconstituted public location that no sovereign can 
disassemble.199 Sovereigns can block dissemination in a locally 
controlled web, but cannot expunge from the “world wide web” 
information obtained by remote means and used to expose a 
sovereign power’s rights and wrongs.200  
 
 197 Id. at 201 (quoting letter from DeGaulle to Sartre, Apr. 19, 1967, in 
AGAINST THE CRIME OF SILENCE: PROCEEDINGS OF THE RUSSELL INTERNATIONAL WAR 
CRIMES TRIBUNAL (John Duffet ed., 1968)). 
 198 See, e.g., Elizabeth Heron & Stephen Farrell, The War Logs: Newly Disclosed 
Iraq War Reports, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22, 2010, 5:03 PM), http://atwar.blog.nytimes.com/
2010/10/22/iraq-war-reports/ (second cache of documents from archives of wars by U.S. in 
the Middle East, published by the New York Times after consulting with the Pentagon). The 
ability of the sovereign to push back can be seen in the confinement of Julian Assange to the 
London embassy of Ecuador, the imprisonment of Bradley Manning, and the exile of 
Edward Snowden in Russia, all in places over which sovereigns determine their status. 
John F. Burns & Ravi Somaiya, In Embassy Drama, Eyes of Police (and Public) Focus on 
Assange, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012, at A12, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/19/world/
europe/julian-assange-under-watch-at-ecuadorean-embassy.html; Charlie Savage, Manning 
Is Acquitted of Aiding the Enemy, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2013, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/31/us/bradley-manning-verdict.html (describing acquittal 
of Bradley Manning for releasing classified documents but Manning’s conviction for 
violation of the Espionage Act of 1917); Steven Lee Myers & Andrew E. Kramer, Defiant 
Russia Grants Snowden Year’s Asylum, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, at A1, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/02/world/europe/edward-snowden-russia.html. 
 199 Cover, supra note 196, at 121. 
 200 The material released by Edward Snowden had multiple custodians able to 
prevent its destruction in any one place, yet the British government engaged in the 
futile exercise, enabled by control of physical location but frustrated by the un-
physicality of information on the path to becoming viral, of physically destroying hard 
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The traditional power of the sovereign to suppress 
information through control over place—offices, paper files, 
secured communications—begins to dissolve when determined 
insiders-turned-outsiders can duplicate and scatter digital copies 
of state secrets.201 The state’s monopoly of lawful physical force 
within land boundaries is no longer sufficient to impose an 
information blackout on official secrets. 
VII. SUGGESTIONS FOR STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLE 
AFFECTING CERTAIN PLACE TOPICS 
The following are tentative examples of principles that 
might be drafted to address issues affecting the role or 
regulation of place in specific legal areas. 
A. Place in the Provision of Medical Treatment 
Regulation of place in connection with the provision of 
medical treatment should be fashioned to support patient privacy, 
to facilitate consultation with medical personnel authorized to 
provide advice in a confidential setting free of outside monitors, to 
allow maximum patient autonomy without non-medically 
indicated intrusion on home settings in which patients may 
privately administer prescribed medications with adequate access 
to remote communication in the event of complications, and to 
avoid medically unnecessary technological depictions of the 
internal organs of the body that violate the normal physical 
boundaries of the human anatomy.202 The patient should enjoy 
                                                                                                                                     
drives at the Guardian newspaper. See Julian Borger, NSA Files: Why the Guardian in 
London Destroyed Hard Drives of Leaked Files, GUARDIAN (Aug. 20, 2013, 1:23 PM), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/20/nsa-snowden-files-drives-destroyed-london. 
 201 James Risen, Snowden Says He Took No Secret Files to Russia, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/18/world/snowden-says-he-took-no-secret-
files-to-russia.html (explaining his concern about secret spying programs and his view 
that the only means of expressing opposition to the spying program was to go outside 
the control over employees by the National Security Agency). 
 202 This statement of multiple purposes in the law regulating the provision of 
medical care bears some resemblance to the mixture of purposes in criminal law 
discussed in Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 401 (1958). Hart suggested certain modifications, at a level of generality that 
sought to capture humane principles, in the Statement of Purposes contained in the 
first draft of the Model Penal Code, e.g., 
(a) To foster the development of personal capacity for responsible decision to 
the end that every individual may realize his potentialities as a participating 
and contributing member of his community:  
(b) To declare the obligation of every competent person to comply with (1) 
those standards of behavior which a responsible individual should know are 
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the maximum control over the space which he/she occupies for the 
medical treatment required, in the medical judgment of an 
attending physician satisfactory to the patient, for prudent 
administration or provision of medical service. Care should be 
taken in prescribing minimal standards for a facility in which 
medical services are provided to avoid the imposition of 
unnecessary cost if it is reasonably foreseeable that such cost may 
impair access to the service for which a facility is intended. Cost–
benefit analysis may be used to assess the need for specified 
standards for a facility, with experiential data utilized to achieve 
an objective assessment of cost and benefit. Providers of medical 
services should be encouraged to utilize technology to increase 
access to medical services by persons in need of medical service in 
remote locations. Remote consultation with patients, as by 
teleconferencing and like technology, should be deployed in the 
interests of patients located at a distance from a physical facility 
and in the interests of patient privacy and confidential receipt of 
medical services. 
The regulation of the place in which medical services 
are provided, or of the human body itself as a place, should have 
no purpose other than protecting and advancing the safety and 
autonomy of the patient. Viewing the internal organs should be a 
matter of patient choice, and technology creating images of the 
internal organs should be used only with patient consent or as a 
result of medical necessity. Place in connection with medical 
services should consider the deeply rooted tradition of privacy 
originating in the home, a traditional site for autonomous care of 
individual medical needs under conditions of autonomy. Medical 
facilities should provide an emotionally supportive setting for all 
patients, with reasonable access to patients by volunteers 
providing psychological comfort and group support for patients 
who wish to have their presence. Patients should be given full 
access to information kiosks and other forms of full disclosure of 
the array of support groups available to advise, counsel, and 
comfort them. Restrictions on medical procedures should not 
depend upon a non-medical mandate relating to anatomical 
features of the body but to commonly accepted protocols on 
                                                                                                                                     
imposed by the conditions of community life if the benefits of community 
living are to be realized, and (2) those further obligations of conduct, specially 
declared by the legislature, which the individual either in fact knows or has 
good reason to know he is supposed to comply with, and to prevent violations 
of these basic obligations of good citizenship by providing for public 
condemnation of the violations and appropriate treatment of the violators[.] 
Id. at 440-41. 
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prudent medical methods for the preservation of the patient’s 
life and health. 
B. Place in the Practice of Psychiatry and the Provision of 
Psychological Counseling 
Working with professional associations, states should 
develop protocols for the practice of psychiatry and the 
provision of psychological counseling using commonly approved 
techniques involving remote technology, experimentation with 
online simulations, and writing medical prescriptions across state 
lines. Such protocols should avoid imposing restrictions on the use 
of technology across state lines if they are permitted in-state. In 
addition, states should seek to advance knowledge of techniques 
that can reduce cost to clients, improve therapeutic results with 
forms of sound technological innovation that creates virtual 
interactive experiences, and, in the delivery of services through 
remote connections, protect privacy. Professional associations 
should incorporate the most advanced protective features into 
technology that protect patient privacy, with periodic audits of 
the security of existing client protection. 
C. Place in Access to Marriage 
Principles that are anchored to systematic thinking 
about the rational weight that place can bear in arranging legal 
rights have the potential to move forward one area of mixed 
common law doctrine and statutory law. Today, statutory 
marriage law in the form of licensing regimes has a large impact 
on the ability of couples to marry without regard to their current 
physical location, either apart from one another and unable to 
travel, or in a jurisdiction that denies them marriage rights.203 
Typically, marriage licensing statutes require the physical 
presence of both parties to the proposed marriage in the state 
that issues the marriage license to the couple.204 A handful of 
states permit proxy marriage, but confine it to limited 
categories of person (soldiers in a war zone, the moribund).205 
The rationale for permitting it for some who need distance 
access but denying it to others is weak and unarticulated.206 
 
 203 Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 6, at 742. 
 204 Id. at 736-37. 
 205 Id. at 758-60. 
 206 Mae Kuykendall, Equality Federalism: A Solution to the Marriage Wars, 15 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 377, 431 (2012) (citing Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423 (6th 
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With the emergence of same-sex marriage in a subset of 
states, same-sex couples are beginning to undertake high 
visibility efforts to overcome barriers of distance from a favorable 
marriage legal regime. Healthy couples routinely travel to states 
to marry, and these states make some efforts to become a 
marriage tourism destination. Other couples, however, require 
the extraordinary aid of air ambulances contributed by supporters 
to permit an ill partner to be present on the tarmac of a marriage-
friendly state long enough to enter a legal American marriage. 207 
Now that such marriages will be recognized by the federal 
government,208 couples have strong estate planning reasons to 
desire to marry, as well as symbolic concerns. 
For marriage law, an appropriate treatment of place 
should recognize the waning importance of physical location to 
the values that marriage, as a legal construct and as an 
expression of individual autonomy, is designed to support. The 
place-sensitive principle of marriage law could be proposed for 
reform of marriage procedure as follows. 
Jurisdictions enacting marriage laws should design the 
laws to afford access to their citizens, and to non-citizens for 
reasonably defined needs, for access to their marriage entry 
laws. States traditionally offer their marriage laws to any 
couple present in their state, however briefly, with no inquiry 
into the personal history of the non-residents who are provided 
with marriage solemnization services. States should seek to 
provide comparable access to couples who may marry under 
their marriage laws even if they are out of the state. States 
should experiment with safeguards relating to identity 
verification and with the conditions making a couple eligible to 
marry remotely under the state’s laws. Factors to consider are 
inability of an ill partner to travel, presence in a foreign 
jurisdiction with procedural barriers to timely provision of 
marriage services or problems in recordation of marriages, and 
lack of means to travel to a jurisdiction in which marriage 
services are available to them. Jurisdictions should consider 
offering more extensive remote access to their marriage law, but 
                                                                                                                                     
Cir. 2012)) (rejecting state interest in enforcing an earlier deadline for voting by non-
military personnel compared with military voters and explaining that, “while there is a 
compelling reason to provide more opportunities for military voters to cast their 
ballots, there is no corresponding satisfactory reason to prevent non-military voters 
from casting their ballots as well”). 
 207 Julie Zimmerman, To Get Married, They Left Ohio, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, 
(July 14, 2013), http://news.cincinnati.com/article/20130714/NEWS10/307140009/.  
 208 Annie Lowrey, Gay Marriages in All States Get Recognition from the I.R.S., 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2013, at A12. 
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should, at a minimum, seek to offer their marriage law on an 
equitable basis to individuals not able to pass through their state 
but who are precluded by their location elsewhere from receiving 
the benefits of marriage law for those able to be present in the 
jurisdiction. Additional charges for a remote service are 
justifiable, but should not preclude access to couples of average 
means. Note that the principle specifically identifies place as 
lacking the weight afforded it by states who permit marriage 
tourism as a means of gaining access to their marriage law but 
deny access to those unable to be physically present.209 
This proposed principle recommends states create some 
remote access to marriage for couples with defined needs, and 
suggests room for states to experiment with fee structures to 
provide portable marriage law as a state service appropriate to 
contemporary understandings of the receding importance of 
physical location for consuming marriage law. The principle 
attempts to give place a realistic influence in marriage law in 
light of couples’ practices and needs, to encourage states to 
expand the availability of their marriage law through 
experimentation with safeguards and fee structures. It is a 
principle that asks for states to consider more creative uses of 
sovereignty in a world with legal spatiality that is growing 
beyond the bounds of physical spatiality. The principle urges 
states to offer law capaciously in light of the power of a 
humanely conceived sovereignty to transcend the mixed legacy 
of sovereign authority conceived as arising from force-control 
over bounded land. This principle posits that states have a 
moral obligation to conceive of the governing authority as an 
asset that should be deployed to extend the aid of law across 
 
 209 Today, with the increasing number of states that offer same-sex marriage, 
there is a compelling logic to “marriage-equality” states’ relaxing the requirement of 
physical presence by the couple in the state before the officiant. A critical consideration 
is the ability to use marital status for the taxation of an estate if a same-sex couple has 
been legally married in a jurisdiction that authorizes same-sex marriage. The Author 
has personally advised a lawyer for a couple, one of whom was too ill to travel, 
concerning a United States jurisdiction which had judges willing to enter orders 
requiring a clerk to record a marriage done with one party available by phone and one 
party present before the judge. The couple successfully entered a marriage through a 
similar means. E-mail between Mae Kuykendall, Professor of Law, Michigan State 
University College of Law, and a Person Who Wishes to Remain Anonymous (Fall 
2013) (as part of phone and e-mail contact regarding the means of combining same-sex 
marriage and remote marriage). Because the couple does not want publicity, it is not 
possible to cite correspondence. Nonetheless, the example of combining the existence of 
same-sex marriage with a judicial work-around in a state that does not authorize 
remote marriage indicates the propriety of and the need for explicit legislation guided 
by principles of fair marriage procedure that afford to place its appropriate weight for 
granting and regulating marriage access and recognition. 
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space and time and expand its beneficial functions of ordering 
legal rights and providing forms of protection and dignity to 
those who are not physically proximate, but whose needs are 
known and remediable with a larger imaginative scope for law-
making by states. 
CONCLUSION: PLACE AND LAW 
A. Does Theorizing Place Disrupt the Quest for Law as 
Conceptual Order? 
Could a Restatement of place have a plausible chance as 
a means of further developing a coherent account of place in 
legal doctrine? Or is recognition of place as an orienting feature 
of law too disruptive to a claim of orderly reasoning and 
justification of legal force to be compatible with a positive account 
of the law? Bromley has summarized a conception of the state and 
law as both deeply geographic, with the development by elites of 
formalized systems of precedent as the means of imposing 
centralizing authority over loosely organized villages and 
communes.210 The notion is that law, with its centralizing, 
territorial drive, is the enemy of social connectivity that arises in 
small communities and replicates itself in similar communities 
across time and space if not captured by the territorial logic of 
systems of formal law.211 Does probing the logic of place lead to 
critique only and not to construction and improvement of 
defensible legal doctrine? Or, in contrast, might success in a 
project to restate and rationalize place in the law only deepen 
the grasp of precedent over the nuances and connections in 
social life that wither under the force of formal logic, the 
bureaucratic system, and legal authority? Is place so deeply 
political and so central to law that a project to restate law 
cannot absorb a direct treatment and formal rationalization of 
its conceptual logic?212 Restatement attention to place might 
augur an approach authorizing smaller scale projects, tethered 
to manageable subsets of the larger domain, and taking 
multiple forms: Restatements, Principles, and Model Codes. 
 
 210 NICHOLAS BLOMLEY, LAW, SPACE, AND THE GEOGRAPHIES OF POWER 37-38 
(1994) (explaining the work of Peter Kropotkin, a nineteenth century geographer/anarchist 
who used imagination about geography to critique social arrangements). 
 211 Id. 
 212 Duncan Hollis, Breaking News: The Fourth Restatement on the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 23, 2012 4:18 PM), 
http://opiniojuris.org/2012/10/23/breaking-news-the-fourth-restatement-on-the-foreign-
relations-law-of-the-united-states/. 
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The pervasiveness of place in intuitive thinking counsels 
against understanding the effects of probing the logic of place in 
law as purely disruptive or dangerously consolidating. With the 
flux in the brute power of place, and the place metaphor 
nonetheless continuing to serve as an orienting concept for 
physical reality and the new mobilities transcending place and 
time, law should seek a deeper account of the place “place” merits 
in legal reasoning, the assignment of rights, and the 
understanding of facts. 
B. Summing Up: A Plan? 
One can readily conclude that place, at this point in 
legal history, is most suited to a statement of principles, or, for 
subsets of “the law of place,” model codes that capture the 
principles that should guide the making of law in connection 
with a subject for which place is a critical influence. Place as a 
component of law, either overtly or implicitly, is amorphous 
and uncategorized. The task of stating principles is daunting. 
But the distinctive feature of criminal law was amorphous 
before the ALI Principles succeeded in giving it coherence and 
shape.213 Despite being understood as a loosely delineated area 
of legal concern, its “aims” were insufficiently specified, which 
called for decisions about the scope of an ALI treatment of 
criminal law, as well as a choice about the purpose of principles 
to guide it.214 
For place, the first cut at an attempt to define and 
organize the dimension of its role as a legal category would be 
dividing up the legal universe into arenas that directly involve 
the regulation of place as a legal problem. Examples might 
include scheduling the use of a facility, such as a park; making 
rules for the construction or regulation of buildings for habitation; 
determining which legal regulator controls boundaries, such as 
shorelines where loading and unloading ships occurs; defining 
and regulating the physical workplace in a world of 
 
 213 Hart, supra note 202, at 401 (asserting the complexity of the purposes 
animating criminal law and the need to create a statement prioritizing them). 
 214 Herbert Wechsler discussed the complications of bringing academic attention and 
suggested principles to a body of law neglected by scholars and featuring “accidental or 
fortuitous” differences among the states. Herbert Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal 
Code, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1097, 1101 (1952). As to scope, he set out the need to address threshold 
definitional issues affecting the coverage of criminal law, considerations in varying sanctions 
for different behavior, and a group of questions about treatment methods, extent of discretion, 
and administration. Id. at 1104-45. 
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telecommuting. A raw listing of such topics would permit a search 
for commonalities that produce a theory of decision.215 
One would then turn to the formulation of principles for 
identifying place as a substantial presence in a topic area that 
is not manifestly about place. For example, I have argued that 
place has become the critical feature in the regulation of 
reproductive health, or, more particularly, abortion. I have 
made tentative suggestions for recognizing that the topic of 
abortion has shifted to a regulation of place, and even to a 
conception of the interior of the female body as a place. It thus 
makes sense to formulate principles addressing the acceptable 
treatment of abortion as a phenomenon now heavily affected by 
place regulation, and to shape a legal model for a rational use of 
law to support reproductive health and underlying norms for any 
state control over a human body. Such a legal principle might well 
rule out the treatment of the interior of a human body, because it 
is observable with new technologies, as a place subject to 
regulation. It might further acknowledge that regulations of the 
body intended to confine its possessor to restricted locations for 
receiving services or self-help, with the goal of controlling the 
bodily interior, are not permitted. The shifting meaning of place 
has growing significance for an area of law created by a law 
review article—privacy.216  
Perhaps the overarching question to ask to identify 
place-infused legal subjects is, “In this area of law, in what way 
are legal rights affected by images of, or facts about, proximity, 
enclosure, fixed location, or comparative claims on first presence 
in a location?” One practical method would be a comprehensive 
review of existing legal treatises, Restatements, Principles, Model 
Codes, cases and codes, and regulations, to tease out the presence 
of place in each subject matter. Leading edge computer techniques 
are under development to study the interconnectedness of the law, 
seeking semantic connections and clusters that reveal patterns of 
citation and evolution in legal doctrine.217 
 
 215 For deception, Levmore concludes: “I have suggested that even though 
judges do not think of this [deception] as an area of law, the cases, though found in 
disparate recognized areas, can be rationalized with a single theory, in this case the 
cost-benefit or hypothetical bargain theory.” Levmore, supra note 13, at 1381. 
 216 Levmore, supra note 13, at 1383 (citing Samuel W. Warren & Louis D. 
Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)). 
 217 Michael J. Bommarito II, Daniel Martin Katz & Jon Zelner, Law as a 
Seamless Web? Comparison of Various Network Representations of the United States 
Supreme Court Corpus (1791–2005), PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH INTERNATIONAL 
CONFERENCE ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LAW (June 14, 2009), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1419525. 
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Next, the question might be, “Is the image one of brute 
fact, or is it structured by a metaphor of place or a hypothetical 
visualization of something as situated in an observable place?” 
The first set of questions should probe the presence and logic of 
place in the determination of legal rights and obligations by 
breaking down the components of a doctrine, using a search for 
some clue about the role of situatedness, observableness, and 
primary claims over space. Contract law has addressed place to 
minimize its incoherence; the ability in contracts to specify the 
applicable law, without regard to the place of contracting, 
recognizes that place does not carry a substantial weight in 
creating a workable contract understanding. So contract law in 
its general doctrine controls place by permitting it to be 
stipulated and thus deprived of its unconsidered sway in 
imposing obligations based on location. The next set of questions 
should probe the rational connection of the conception of place to 
the legal matter it resolves. The candidates for evaluation are 
utilitarian or rights-grounded. It seems unlikely that all aspects 
of place could be considered under one overriding utilitarian or 
rights-concerned principle. As an example, Hart analyzed a 
curative–rehabilitative framework for punishment as focusing 
on the individual rather than general commands, and thus both 
potentially undermining the general command and visiting 
cruelty upon an individual for who he is rather than what he 
did.218 Such fine-grained consideration of one purpose in one 
context complicates the use of one overriding principle. 
For place, many questions might be organized using the 
principles that are present in other legal categories relevant to 
the particular place-affected problem. For example, theories of 
contract freedom could be a presence in place conceptions of the 
workplace. For the trend of working in the home for an 
employer, the focus is on the reclassification of a home as an 
extension of the workplace, and thus in a reclassification of the 
workplace in connection with employee autonomy and the 
qualities of the home as a place of repose and shelter. The 
question arises whether unbundling the employer’s relationship 
from the employee by severing physical presence and direct 
physical control over the workplace fundamentally reorders the 
relationship in ways that revitalize nineteenth century 
conceptions of the employee as a freely contracting individual 
who assumes risks of work-related injuries and is responsible for 
his own welfare. The overall context for evaluation is existing 
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labor law and workplace safety regulations. The decision about 
the correct response would require extensive consideration of the 
costs and benefits of existing employee-employer regulations if 
transferred to the home as a worksite. A decision would call for 
some evaluation of the cost benefits of current regulations for 
workers physically situated in the employer’s work site. It would 
also call for empirical data on the actual work environment in 
homes for types of off-site work. What kinds of abuses might be 
occurring? Are freely contracting technology workers effectively 
absorbing the social costs of the workplace and thus benefitting 
individually in ways that enhance general social welfare? Is 
shifting costs and pricing of labor externalities to internalized 
employee-contractor personal arrangements efficient by 
avoiding over-regulation and providing greater worker control 
over allocating compensation between workplace welfare and 
income? Should regulations be shaped for the type of worker 
and the associated risks? The overarching question is how our 
conception of the social problems of the workplace is altered by 
the flux in the imagined physical structure of the typical 
workplace as a site of employer control and physical presence. 
Does work in the home change the understanding of the worker 
as subject to the physical supervision of the employer, and thus 
so deprived of autonomy as to require high levels of employer 
responsibility to worker welfare? Or does it enhance the need 
for worker protection by regulation and legal accountability? 
At the end of his treatment of deception as a possible 
category of legal doctrine amenable to constructing a theory of 
its principles, Levmore concedes that it is “unlikely that the 
theory of deception sketched here could smoothly incorporate 
all, or nearly all, the known cases in which deception plays some 
role” but argues that the proposed theory “does gather in a 
number of cases not previously connected and not intentionally 
made consistent with one another.”219 For the role place should 
have in formulating laws, regulations, and rules, there need be 
no comprehensive theory tested by its capacity to explain all 
cases in which place can be detected. Initial efforts at typology 
and detection of core moral and logical precepts could form one 
avenue to propounding model laws or principles. For certain, 
the nature of place as a relatively unseen presence in legal 
materials calls for careful attention to the weight it is capable 
of bearing in a universe in which law supports the goals of 
order, fairness, and consistency. 
 
 219 Levmore, supra note 13, at 1382. 
